

Black September: A turning point in the Palestinian National Movement

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ABSTRACT

In term, Black September is an era of the Jordanian Civil War which was started in September 1970 and ended in July of 1971. The civil war was fought between the two major groups of the Jordan, the Palestinians represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and the Trans-Jordanians represented by the Jordanian Armed Forces under the leadership of King Hussein. At its core the civil war sought to determine if Jordan would be ruled by the PLO or the Hashemite Monarchy. The war resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, most of them were Palestinian. Armed conflict lasted until July 1971 with the expulsion of Palestinian PLO's fighters from the Jordan's territory. Black September came as turning point in Palestinian National Movement because mostly PLO's fighters killed by Israeli's intelligence Mossad after Munich Massacre. This paper is an attempt to explore the series of factors which led to Black September and its impact on Palestinian National Movement.

Key Words : Black September, Palestinian National Movement, Israel, Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, Jordan, Munich Massacre, Mossad

INTRODUCTION

Palestinian Nationalism is the National Movement of the Palestinian people and it has roots in Pan-Arabism, the rejection of colonialism and movements calling for national independence.¹ After the First World War, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an increasing sense of Arab identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, particularly Syria, considered to include both northern Palestine and Lebanon. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known as al-Nahda ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arab renaissance"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of Arabic.²

In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab National Movements gained strength in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and Nablus, Aref al-Aref joined Hajj Amin al-Husseini, his brother Fakhri Al Husseini, Ishaq Darweesh, Ibrahim Daeweesh, Jamal al- Husayni, Kamel Al Budeiri, and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So'oud in establishing the Arab Club.³ Following the arrival of the British a number of Muslim-Christian Associations were established in all the major towns. In 1919 they joined together to hold the first Palestine Arab Congress in Jerusalem. Its main platforms were a call for representative

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government and opposition to the Balfour Declaration. The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly. In response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret society al-Kaff al-Sawada' (the Black-hand, its name soon changed to al-Fida'iyya, the Self-Sacrificers) was founded; it later played an important role in secret anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters to Nablus, the Jerusalem branch was run by Mahmud Aziz al-Khalidi.⁴

After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husseini and Nashashibi⁵ clans into a serious rift,⁶ with long-term consequences for al-Husseini and Palestinian nationalism. The High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, as a counterbalance to the Raghib al-Nashashibi gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amin al-Husseini and Aref al-Aref and established a Supreme Muslim Sharia Council (SMC) on 20 December 1921.⁷ The SMC was to have authority over all the Muslim *Waqfs* (religious endowments) and Sharia (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the Council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amin al-Husseini as a president of the Council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.

During the British mandate period, the disturbances of the Wailing Wall in 1928 were repeated in 1929. However the violence in the Palestinian riots that followed, that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity and was the first instance that indigenous Sephardi and Mizrahi had been killed.⁸ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam established the Black Hand gang in 1935 and he died in a shootout against the British forces. He has been popularized in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight against Zionism.⁹ The Nashashibi broke with the Arab High Committee and Hajj Amin al-Husseini shortly after the contents of the Palestine

Royal Commission report was released announcing a Partition plan. The Great revolt 1936-1939 was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish Immigration. The British had estimated the al-Najjada Para military scout movement, led by Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, strength as 8,000 prior to 1947.¹⁰ The revolt of 1936-39 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini¹¹ moved to Egypt in 1946, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead the Army of the Holy War (AHW) in January 1948, and was killed during hand-to-hand fighting against Haganah.¹² Al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command, was appointed as commander of the AHW. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, at the head of the Arab Liberation Army remained as the only prominent military commander.¹³ The split in the ranks of the Arab High Committee between rejectionists and pro Partitionists led to Hajj Amin al-Husseini taking control of the AHC and with the support of the Arab League rejected the plan. However many Palestinians, principally Nashashibi family and the Arab Palestinian Communist Party, accepted the plan.

In 1948, with the establishment of the Jews state of Israel, along with the Palestinian migration, the common experience of the Palestinian refugee Arabs was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.¹⁴ The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly in the Palestinian refugee Diaspora. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, most of the Husseini family peoples relocated to Jordan and the Gulf States. Many family heads that remained in the Old City and the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem fled due to hostilities with the Jordanian government—which controlled that part of the city; King Abdullah's murderer was a member of an underground Palestinian organization led by Daoud al-Husseini.

The Fatah movement was espousing a Palestinian nationalist ideology and led by Palestinian, was founded in 1959 by members of the Palestinian Diaspora — principally professionals working in

the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in Cairo or Beirut. The founders included Yasser Arafat who was head of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) (1952–56) in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khaled Yashruti was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–62).¹⁵

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964¹⁶ following an earlier decision of the Arab League; its goal was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.¹⁷ The original PLO Charter (issued on 28 May 1964¹⁸ stated that “Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral regional unit” and sought to “prohibit... the existence and activity” of Zionism.¹⁹ The charter also called for a right of return and self-determination for Palestinians. Defeat suffered by the Arab states in the June 1967 Six-day War, brought the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip under Israeli military control. Yasser Arafat claimed the Battle of Karameh as a victory (in Arabic, “*Karameh*” means “dignity”)²⁰ and quickly became a Palestinian national hero; portrayed as one who dared to confront Israel. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure, Ahmad Shukeiri resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost. Israel was calling their army the indomitable army but this was the first chance for Arabs to claim victory after defeat in 1948, ’53, and ’67. After the Battle of Karameh, After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO’s strength²¹ and Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.²²

Black September :

In 1970, some two-thirds of the Jordanian population was Palestinian. After the Arabs’ defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, or Six Day War, Palestinian militants took part in ‘the War of attribution’²³ against Israel. The war was mostly fought in the Sinai between Egyptian and Israeli forces. But the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched raids from Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon as well. The Jordanian king had not been keen to fight the 1967 war, nor was he eager to keep letting Palestinians attack Israel from his territory, or from the West Bank, which had been under Jordanian control until Israel occupied it in 1967.²⁴ King Hussein had maintained secret, pleasant relations with Israel through the 1950s and 60s. But he had to balance his interests in preserving a peace with Israel against a restless and increasingly radicalized Palestinian population, which was threatening his throne.²⁵ Arafat created a war zone on Lebanon’s border with Israel like the one he had made in the Jordan Valley. His revolutionary strategy against Israel, though bloody, still brought no military success. Again, too, although he subscribed not to intervene in his host country’s politics, Arafat’s behavior threatened that country’s stability. However, Lebanon was an even more flexible host for Arafat than Jordan had been, and his political fortunes continued to prosper despite his failures. It is true, in Lebanon there were smaller number of Palestinians than in Jordan and no direct access to the West Bank. But the large Palestinian minority gave Arafat a support base as areas of the Lebanon-Israel border were excellent for launching attacks.²⁶ Beirut, then the Arab world’s most modern, cosmopolitan city, offered better access to the Western media, which Arafat was learning well how to manipulate, and a more pleasant lifestyle for PLO leaders than had dour Amman. Another important factor was Lebanon’s weak central government and Army which could not restrict PLO activities. By the same token, the country was less able than Jordan to resist bullying by other Arab states, like Egypt’s demand that it gives Arafat a free hand to operate in Lebanon. From 1968 to 1973, Lebanon’s army clashed with the PLO, trying to control its power. Each time, though, the Beirut government caved in to the demands of Arafat and his foreign patrons. Nonetheless while Lebanon’s deep domestic divisions gave the PLO powerful local allies, once again the prospect of exercising power in his host

country seduced Arafat into growing entanglements in local politics, which made him more enemies than friends.

In Beirut, Arafat managed the creation of a large political, military, and economic infrastructure, which was well financed by Arab governments' donations and taxes on Palestinians working in Arab states. Illegal methods, which Arafat made no attempt to stop, swelled its treasury and enriched those involved. These included forcing Lebanese businesses that were moving goods through ports to pay protection money to Fatah, whose members also ran large illicit trades in arms, medical supplies, and even drugs. Some robbed stores and turned the loot over to their groups, which then sold it back to the merchants and split the profit with the thieves.²⁷ Such activities damaged the movement's image among the Lebanese and diverted the PLO from its political goals. Some of these earnings benefited the Palestinian people, for whom Fatah built hospitals, orphanages, schools, and a police and judicial system. Fatah also had a relief fund for families of those killed in the service of the cause and a network of economic enterprises, including a textile plant and farms, which employed about three thousand people.²⁸ In the refugee camps, 150,000 Palestinians depended on Fatah for everything, including trade unions, garbage collection, cultural centers, and youth groups. The program in the UN-run refugee camp schools, funded partly by U.S. taxpayers' money, was revised to offer paramilitary training.²⁹ Before September 1970, Arafat only had about 800 Fatah soldiers in Lebanon, but their numbers tripled as he moved forces from Jordan.³⁰ They were well paid and given bonuses to ensure that they did not defect to other groups. Supposedly, these troops were for use against Israel, but Arafat faced anew the dilemmas over intervention in local politics and conflicts among PLO groups.³¹ Rather than concluding, the interference in Jordan's internal affairs had been a mistake, PLO and Fatah leaders blamed Arafat for not having tried harder to overthrow the king. They wanted the PLO to become the front line of a liberation struggle that would help the masses destroy Arab regimes and fight Western imperialism throughout the Third World.³² Without transforming the Arab world and expelling U.S. influence from the region, they believed, the PLO could not destroy Israel. Lebanon seemed the ideal place to launch this campaign.

Although Arafat never explicitly accepted this argument, he did not stop subordinates from acting as if they were fomenting a worldwide revolution. In Lebanon, PLO forces trained radicals from many countries, who would later initiate violence in places as far-flung as Turkey, Iran, Nicaragua, and Germany. Only after the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1982 did Sudan and later Afghanistan begin to replace the PLO camps as the center for recruiting and training terrorists. At the same time, Arafat also became involved in subverting several Arab states, especially Jordan and Lebanon. Believing that no Arab regime had a right to control or limit PLO activities, even on its own soil, inevitably brought him into collision with those hosting his movement. Since the Arab states were responsible for Palestinian suffering, they must, in Abu Jihad's words, "be a base for our people" and had no right to limit or control the PLO's choice of timing, methods, or anything else, even if Palestinian activities dragged the host country into war or damaged its vital interests.³³

Lebanon was especially vulnerable to this strategy. In the past, its unique system for balancing power among its many religiously defined communities had brought stability and prosperity. But this structure had been undermined by radical ideologies and changing population proportions, which produced forces eager to use the PLO to help them seize power. Arafat heightened the spiraling revolution in the country in several ways.³⁴ To build up his own hand, he supported Lebanese radical groups that were subverting the country and let PLO member groups fight each other, Lebanon's army, and the militias of Lebanese communities.³⁵ Obviously, the PLO's presence and Arafat's policies were not the sole causes of Lebanon's breakdown into a destructive, bloody civil war, which eventually brought it under Syrian control, but they were a major factor in accelerating and deepening this tragic process.³⁶

On 6 September 1970, three airplanes two American and one Swiss, were hijacked by the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).³⁷ One American plane was taken to Egypt, while the other two were forced to land at an old unused airstrip in Jordan. The PFLP threatened to kill the hostages and blow up the planes unless European governments freed Palestinian militant being held in their jails. British Prime Minister Edward Heath released Leila Khaled, who had just been captured by the Israelis and turned over to the British after she had killed a guard while trying to hijack an El Al airliner in British airspace, and other PFLP militant, who had been arrested for earlier attacks, in order to ensure that British hostages were not harmed.³⁸ Arafat freed several Western hostages from the hijacking who came into Fatah's hands but did not criticize the hijackings, probably viewing them as strengthening his cause's power and popularity.³⁹ Jordan, however, saw the hijackings as a challenge to Hussein's authority and as a signal for a revolution to overthrow the king. Jordanian tanks surrounded the airfield, while some officers ordered their troops to march On Amman for a confrontation with the PLO forces, whether their commanders wanted it or not. At this moment of chaos and bloodshed, Arafat chose to escalate his demands, calling for a national unity government as a precondition for any ceasefire and expressing solidarity with the PFLP as a member of the united forces under his command.⁴⁰ Finally, the king decided to move decisively. He declared martial law and demanded that the guerrillas leave Jordan's cities. Arafat called on his troops to be ready and ordered a strike to topple the government.⁴¹

The first clashes between Fatah forces and the Lebanese army had begun in 1968 and continued sporadically for many months. Arafat demanded clear freedom of action while the government insisted that the PLO not cross the border to attack Israel lest this action force the country into war.⁴² The question was settled, in Lebanon as in Jordan, by Nasser, who invited the two sides to Cairo with himself as mediator. On 28 October 1969, the Lebanese delegation arrived. But Arafat refused to come until Lebanon accepted his terms. On 3 November, Lebanon accepted an agreement that gave Arafat full freedom of action as long as he respected Lebanon's laws and sovereignty. Arafat promised that he would not launch attacks from Lebanese border villages, shoot at Israel from Lebanese territory, or lay mines along the frontier.⁴³ But this agreement proved hollow.⁴⁴

As King Hussein was also discovering, Arafat's assurances on such matters quickly proved useless. Within three weeks, clashes began again in southern Lebanon as PLO forces violated the agreement.⁴⁵ Soon Arafat was making speeches urging Lebanon's people to revolt against a government that he accused of being U.S. agents plotting to destroy his movement. Smiling, he told one audience that "the Lebanese people" should punish this behavior.⁴⁶ The country's leaders rightfully considered such statements to be inciting revolution. Even Kamal Junblatt, the Druze chief who was Arafat's main Lebanese ally, unsuccessfully urged Arafat to implement the Cairo agreement.⁴⁷ As Junblatt had feared, the PLO-initiated border war and Israeli counterattacks made thousands of Lebanese civilians flee from the south. At the same moment that Arafat was encouraging revolt against Lebanon's government, he was tightening control over his own movement.⁴⁸ While tolerant of other PLO groups doing as they pleased, Arafat accepted less pluralism within Fatah itself. In 1971, a group of younger members, who called themselves the Free Officers, attacked Arafat for having lost touch with the membership and creating a "cult of personality."⁴⁹ Arafat quickly suppressed them. Arafat's control over Fatah was ensured. When Arafat thought preserving order was vital for his own interests, he was always able to implement that.

When King Hussein decided it was time to act. Throughout September the Jordanian military launched attacks to push the PLO out of Jordan; attacks were termed as "Black September" by the PLO.⁵⁰ Yet Arafat did not depend on repression alone to stay in power. He also met the challenge by showing critics that he was a real revolutionary ready to battle Arab regimes and the West. In 1971, he created a covert international terrorist group within Fatah called Black September, a reference to the September 1970 Palestinian defeat in Jordan. The Black September group was headed by Abu Iyad, staffed by Fatah's intelligence personnel, and used Fatah's facilities and funds. A CIA report concluded

that Arafat maintained a “pretense of moderation” but that “the Fatah leadership including Arafat now seems clearly committed to revolution.”⁵¹

After the crisis in Jordan, the Fedayeen movement was in confusion. The Palestinian got a general impression that the Palestinian movement could not be continued because of the hostile attitude of some of the Arab regimes, particularly of Jordan. The greatest problem for the Fedayeen was how to carry on the movement without any support. This problem was discussed by the Fedayeen leaders in a secret meeting after the crisis. They formed an opinion that the movement should be carry forward with guerillas warfare tactics. These guerillas would receive a special kind of training and would be free from political pressures.

The existence of the black September organization (BSO)⁵² came in light when the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Tal, was assassinated by four member of the organization in Cairo on 28 November 1971⁵³ and these four members were arrested by the Egyptian Government. The arrest led to a big agitation in Egypt in which 35,000 students supported the Palestinian cause demanded war against Israel.⁵⁴ The BSO also punished five Jordanians living in West Germany whom it suspected of intelligence work for Israel. The BSO also made an attempt to kill Jordan’s Ambassadors to Britain; they claimed credit for PLO expulsion from Jordan and the same time “struver” electronic factory at Hamburg, which was supplied electronic generators for the Israeli Air Force, and they were also responsible in August 1972 for sabotaging the Trieste oil refinery in Italy which was sending oil to the “pro-Zionist interests” in Germany and Austria.⁵⁵ In May 1972, two women and two men of Black September group hijack Belegian Sabena airplane to Lyada Airport. They demanded release of the Palestinian peoples, those were in Israeli Jails. The men hijackers were shot dead by the Israeli forces and the girls were captured. The Lyada airport operation failed and the BSO waited for the next opportunity.⁵⁶

Munich Massacre :

At the time of the hostage-taking, the 1972 Munich Olympic Games were well⁵⁷ into their second week. The West German Olympic Organizing Committee had encouraged an open and friendly atmosphere in the Olympic Village, to help remove memories of the militaristic image of wartime Germany and, specifically, of the 1936 Berlin Olympics,⁵⁸ which had been exploited by Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler for propaganda purposes.

On the evening of 4 September, the Israeli athletes enjoyed a night out, watching a performance of Fiddler on the Roof and dining with the play’s star,⁵⁹ Israeli actor Shmuel Rodensky, before returning to the Olympic Village. On the return trip in the team bus, Lalkin denied his 13-year-old son, who had befriended weightlifter Yossef Romano and wrestler Eliezer Halfin, permission to spend the night in their apartment—an innocent refusal that probably saved the boy’s life.⁶⁰ At 4:30 am local time on 5 September, as the athletes slept, eight tracksuit-clad members of the Black September faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, carrying duffel bags loaded with AK-47 assault rifles, Kalashnikov machine pistols, and grenades scaled a two-meter chain-link fence with the assistance of unsuspecting athletes who were also sneaking into the Olympic Village. The athletes were originally identified as Americans, but were claimed to be Canadians decades later.⁶¹ Once inside, they used stolen keys to enter two apartments being used by the Israeli team at 31 Connolly straÙe.⁶² After that the Fedayeen killed to the 11 Israeli athletes, coaches and official which shared five apartments. The attackers were subsequently reported to be part of the Palestinian Fedayeen from refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. They were identified as Luttif Afif (Issa), Yusuf Nazzal (Tony), Afif Ahmed Hamid (Paolo), Khalid Jawad (Salah), Ahmed Chic Thaa (Abu Halla), Mohammed Safady (Badran), Adnan Al-Gashey (Denawi), and his cousin Jamal Al-Gashey (Samir).⁶³

On 5 September, Golda Meir, then-Prime Minister of Israel, appealed to other countries to “save our citizens and condemn the unspeakable criminal acts committed.”⁶⁴ The Palestinians demanded

the release of 234 convicted terrorists being held in Israel, Germany and other countries. The Israelis refused on principle. Then again she stated that “if we [Israel] should give in, then no Israeli anywhere in the world shall feel that his life is safe... it’s blackmail of the worst kind.”⁶⁵ During the crisis, King Hussein of Jordan—the only leader of an Arab country to publicly denounce the Olympic attack—called it a “savage crime against civilization ... perpetrated by sick minds.”⁶⁶

According to journalist John K. Cooley, the hostage situation presented an extremely difficult political situation for the Germans because the hostages were Jewish. He reported that the Germans offered the Palestinians an unlimited amount of money for the release of the athletes, as well as the substitution by high-ranking Germans. However, the kidnappers refused both offers.⁶⁷ Munich police chief Manfred Schreiber and Bruno Merk, interior minister of Bavaria, negotiated directly with the kidnappers, repeating the offer of an unlimited amount of money. Again John K. Cooley stated that the reply was that “money means nothing to us; our lives mean nothing to us.”⁶⁸ Magdi Gohary and Mohammad Khadif, both Egyptian advisers to the Arab League, and A.D. Touny, an Egyptian member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) also helped try to win concessions from the kidnappers, but to no avail. However, the negotiators apparently were able to convince the *fidayeen* that their demands were being considered, as Issa granted a total of five extensions to their deadlines.⁶⁹ Elsewhere in the village, athletes carried on as normal, seemingly oblivious of the events unfolding nearby. The Games continued until mounting pressure on the IOC forced a suspension some 12 hours after the first athlete had been murdered.

At the last minute, The Libyan ambassador in Munich, according to a mediate by reducing the guerrilla observer, next offered to 13, instead of 200, guerrilla prisoners in Israel but it was rejected by the Germans and so were good offices offers by the Tunisian ambassador. At 10:10 pm the guerrillas were taken out by bus to the Olympic village plaza, then flown by three helicopters to Furst enfold buck Military Airport, believing they were on their way to Riem, the main Munich civil airport. The police sharpshooters, only four in number, set the tarp, assisted by either one or two Israeli security officers. The helicopters landed near the Boeing on a floodlit tarmac. Two of the Arabs inspected the plan; then as they returned towards the helicopters, the sharpshooters opened fire. The Arabs covering the helicopters crews appear to have been killed first. Another ran 30 yards to the nearest helicopter and took cover under it. He fired at the airport control tower, killing a policeman and reportedly knocking out the tower radio.⁷⁰

Again John K Cooley argues that the some observers at the airport reported that at 12:04 midnight one Arab jumped out of one of the helicopters and threw a grenade into it. He and another who jumped from the other helicopter were shot instantly. The first helicopter burned, while the surviving Arabs kept fire truck at bay by firing. Then the remaining hostages had been killed by gunshot wounds.⁷¹ Three of the remaining terrorists lay on the ground, two of them feigning death, and were captured by police. Jamal Al-Gashey had been shot through his right wrist, and Mohammed Safady had sustained a flesh wound to his leg. Adnan Al-Gashey had escaped injury completely. Tony, the final terrorist, escaped the scene, but was tracked down with police dogs 40 minutes later in an airbase parking lot. Cornered and bombarded with tear gas, he was shot dead after a brief gunfight. By around 1:30 a.m., the battle was over.⁷²

After the crisis, a shock-wave or horror and revolt went around the world. Western governments led by the Nixon administration in Washington called for drastic ‘anti- terrorist’ measures and they try to spread anti Arabs feeling in the world.

Conclusion :

In conclusion we can say that the Black September came as turning point in the Palestinian National Movement. The frustration of Black September, hijack failure was addressed by PLO’s *fidayeen* by killing 11 Israeli athletes in Munich Olympics because Israel played important role of expulsion of

PLO's from Jordanian's territory. In response to the Massacre at Munich, Israel declared war on terrorist activities and targeted Black September and Fatah equally. Some of Israel's immediate retaliatory acts included killing hundreds of people, most of whom are believed to have been unaffiliated with the terrorist group, during raids of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. These attacks added to already existing tensions between Israel and its neighboring Arab nations, and which ultimately lead to further military conflict.

After the Munich Massacre, the Israeli government, headed by Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Israeli Defense Committee secretly authorized the Mossad to track down and kill those allegedly responsible for the Munich massacre. This argues which was disputed by Zvi Zamir, who described the operation as putting an end to the type of terror that was perpetrated in Europe. To accomplish the task Mossad set up a number of special teams to locate and kill these *fedayeen*, aided by the agency's stations in Europe.

On 9 April 1973, Israel launched 'Operation Spring of Youth' a joint Mossad-Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operation in Beirut. The targets were Mohammad Yusuf al-Najjar (Abu Yusuf), head of Fatah's intelligence army, which ran Black September, Kamal Adwan, who headed the PLO's so-called Western Sector, which controlled PLO action inside Israel; and Kamal Nassir, the PLO spokesman. A group of Sayeret commandos were taken in nine missile boats and a small fleet of patrol boats to a deserted Lebanese beach, before driving in two cars to downtown Beirut, where they killed Najjar, Adwan and Nassir. Two further detachments of commandos blew up the PFLP's headquarters in Beirut and a Fatah explosives plant. The leader of the commando team that conducted the operations was Ehud Barak. In the give months of 1973 the PLO dissolved Black September. A year later Yasser Arafat, the PLO's leader, ordered his followers to withdraw from acts of violence outside Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

On 21 July 1973, in the so-called Lillehammer affair, a team of Mossad agents mistakenly killed Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan man unrelated to the Munich attack, in Lillehammer, Norway, after an informant mistakenly said Bouchiki was Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Force 17 and a Black September operative. Five Mossad agents, including two women, were captured by the Norwegian authorities, while others managed to slip away. The five were convicted of the killing and imprisoned, but were released and returned to Israel in 1975. The Mossad later found Ali Hassan Salameh in Beirut and killed him on 22 January 1979 with a remote-controlled car bomb. The attack killed four passersby and injured 18 others.

The series of killing of the top leaders and operatives after Black September events lead to the weakening of Palestinian National Movement. Targeted attack by Mossad till early 1980s resulted in wiping out whole set of aggressive leadership of PLO. Subsequent call by Arafat to stop warfare operations from foreign land clearly established that Black September was a big turning point in the Palestinian national movement.

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5. Nashashibi is the name of a prominent Palestinian family based in Jerusalem. Many of its members held senior positions in the government/ rule of the Mamluks, Ottoman, British mandate, Jordan and quasi semi self-rule (PA) of Palestine. For more detail visit at the website, at <http://> <http://>

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 8. The 1929 Palestine riots, also known as the Western Wall Uprising, the 1929 Massacres, refers to a series of demonstrations and riots in late August 1929 when a long-running dispute between Muslims and Jews over access to the Western Wall in Jerusalem escalated into violence. The riots took the form in the most part of attacks by Arabs on Jews accompanied by destruction of Jewish property. For more detail visit at the website, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/1929_36.stm
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 10. Ibid
 11. Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini member of the Palestine Arab Party he served as its Secretary-General and became editor-in-chief of the party’s paper *Al-Liwa’* and other newspapers, including *Al-Jami’a Al-Islamiyya*. In 1938, Abd al-Qadir was exiled and in 1939 fled to Iraq where he took part in the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup. For more detail visit at the website, at http://www.listnerd.com/item/abd-al_qadir-al_husayni
 12. Haganah was a Zionist military organization representing the majority of the Jews in Palestine from 1920 to 1948. Organized to combat the revolts of Palestinian Arabs against the Jewish settlement of Palestine, it early came under the influence of the Histadrut (“General Federation of Labour”). Although it was outlawed by the British Mandatory authorities and was poorly armed, it managed effectively to defend Jewish settlements. For more detail visit at the website, at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/251461/Haganah>
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