

## **Non-traditional Security Threats and the State**

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The structural changes of the post-Cold War era have resulted in new views on the definition and nature of security. The approach does, however, suggest that the newly emerging concept of security does not resonate with more traditional approaches to national and international security, which focuses on physical threats to the state. "The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of holocaust. It has been related to nation-states more than people. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards".<sup>1</sup>

The state's purpose, fundamentally, is to ensure that the welfare of its citizens is promoted, and the security of citizens is taken care of.<sup>2</sup> As a corollary, since the Treaty of Westphalia, it is assumed that the basis on which world affairs are organised would be the state, in which the sovereignty would be vested. However, in the rapidly changing scenario, the will of the state and its capability to ensure its writ in order to ensure it fulfills its fundamental duty, is often severely limited. In the present time, the changing security paradigm has moved beyond mere protection of a state's territorial inviolability, political freedom to act and questions of sovereignty, to embrace matters as diverse as the condition of children in conflict zones; acts of terror; smuggling of arms, narcotics and people; the spread of infectious epidemics; and trans-border environmental depredations.<sup>3</sup> Those in the field of security analysis, have to contend with multiple threats represented by a hydra-headed monster: external threats, internal disturbance, capacity of the state to withstand threats and its brittleness, states which have failed/ are on the verge of doing so, economic development or the lack thereof, structural adjustment, relations between genders, between those professing varying ethnic identities, and transnational and global problems like AIDS, drug trafficking, terrorism, and environmental degradation.<sup>4</sup>

One of the defining attributes of the global political system in the latter half of the 20th century is the significant increase in the quantity and quality of non-state actors. With the

start of the UN, and a host of multilateral organisations in its wake, and the proliferation of an international bureaucracy, the interdependence and communication between societies has grown, and as a result, a number of variegated organisational structures, at both, a regional and global level, have become operational. The emergence of such non-state actors and their growing engagement with issues which, are germane to grappling with the problems the modern world is facing, is also a challenge to the old assumption that only states are important actors in world politics, and thus the threats to security originate mainly from traditional approaches.<sup>5</sup> The historic end of the Cold War, combined with the rising tide of globalisation, environmental degradation and international terrorism, has opened new facets of security.<sup>6</sup> Traditionally, the definition of national security was seen as the ability of a state to protect its interests from threats without. Such interests could broadly be classified as territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. However, in the present complex web of international relations, the threat to security emanates not only from one nation to another but also from different non-state sources of insecurity. There is an increasing need to expand the traditional model of security in order to address the non-traditional threats and in doing so, to develop a more comprehensive approach to security.<sup>7</sup> Non-traditional security (NTS) matters example transnational crime, terrorism, disaster relief, information security, climate change, and public health epidemics are now considered important enough to be regarded core national security issues.<sup>8</sup> The non-traditional security approach, thus by its very nature, is a multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach, which addresses critical welfare issues and matters of survival. Both challenges and solutions are not isolated phenomena in this model; they are not only interconnected, but even sometimes interdependent. Non-traditional and human security must be approached in an inclusive and “holistic” manner not only examining the symptoms or manifestations of human insecurity, but also seeking to produce recommendations that address root causes.<sup>9</sup> Since non-traditional security is transnational, out-flowing and inward flowing, its threat sources are multiple and uncertain, and its referent objects are plural, it has exerted a far-reaching influence on international relations.<sup>10</sup> Non-traditional security has to show how it is different from issues of welfare and governance. For it does not include every health issue, or welfare and development matter. But when such matters reach a tipping point, they become security hazards. At such times they are in a position to undermine and diminish the survival chances of large parts of the citizenry besides threatening the stability and integrity of society itself.<sup>11</sup> Such security challenges sometimes spill over territorial borders as well, causing a range of wider security concerns, and causing of instability such as global crime, transnational terrorism, refugee flows, illegal trafficking in narcotics.<sup>12</sup>

The turn of the century has seen the emergence of many non-state actors on the world stage, interacting alongside states, and with international organisations. These interactions are visible in transnational networks in international politics.<sup>13</sup> The end of the Cold War was an opportunity utilised by scholars of international relations to focus on subjects besides deterrence and balance of power. Soon other issues gained heightened attention. One of the major issues in this respect is the idea of globalisation. The debate on globalisation within the arena of international relations was focused on the question as to whether the concept was a mere continuation of an old process of time-space compression or a consequence of

heightened communications and transportation networks, as a result of innovations in transportation, media and communications.<sup>14</sup> Organised crime is serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain.<sup>15</sup> Organised crime is characterised by violence or the threat of violence and by the use of bribery and corruption: organised criminals very often depend on the assistance of corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals, notably lawyers, accountants and bankers. Organised crime also uses sophisticated technology to conduct operations, maintain security and evade justice.<sup>16</sup> Well-aware criminal groups have used the greater openness in the Post Cold War era to substantially increase the scope of their activities: they have been helped by the lowering of economic and political barriers, the setting up of nascent and fragile democracies in place of authoritarian communist states, and the surge in genuine international trade, and all this amidst the stupendous technological achievements making possible extremely fast global communication and transport.<sup>17</sup> Owing to globalisation and sundry other causal agents, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings have seen a global increase. The problem is rapidly becoming huge, both in extent and degree due to the growing involvement of organised crime groups.<sup>18</sup> Trafficking in human beings is mostly done by major international organised crime groups. However, they are not the only ones to blame. Organised criminal groups often cooperate with other such groups, with “smaller ad hoc collections of criminals” for the purposes of human trafficking. Thus, it is a quite complicated relationship that exists between organised crime and trafficking in human beings.<sup>19</sup>

Most of the activity of organised crime is aimed at economic gain. The process of money laundering attempts to conceal the link between the illicit funds generated as result of criminal activity, and the said activity.<sup>20</sup> For organised crime groups, it is an extremely important activity, as money earned through crime, continues to remain under the control of the criminal underworld. A portion of the profits is simply reinvested, this being especially true for drugs supply. Thus, as organised crime becomes more profitable, the more important it becomes from the criminal viewpoint, to ensure the shifting the profits into legal activities.<sup>21</sup> There are three steps of money laundering: firstly, cash is injected into the economy by some method (“placement”), secondly, complicated financial transactions are conducted in order to conceal the illegal source (“layering”), and finally, obtaining the money generated from such transactions of the illicit funds (“integration”). Sometimes, some steps are modified/omitted, as per the need; for example, non-moneys proceeds that are already present in the economy system would not need to be placed. The money laundering prevention regime has many aims-including the aforementioned goals of reducing crime, preserving financial system integrity and controlling terrorism.<sup>22</sup> The change in the Internet, from a curiosity to an essential element of modern life for millions, has happened in less than two decades. As per 2011 data, 2.3 billion people, equivalent to more than a third of the world’s population, were on the Internet. And the Internet’s 60 per cent users are in developing countries, while 45 per cent of all internet users are below the age of 25 years.<sup>23</sup> Due to its exponential growth, its regulatory capacity has been left far behind, as in the case of other aspects of globalisation, this absence of authority leaving the door wide open for many abuses. Compounding the problem is the fact that the Internet was based on a military system which aimed at the circumvention of

interference and external controls.<sup>24</sup>

The problem of drugs is a classic example of a transnational threat to security. Transnational threats have at least two of the following attributes: they have cross-border causes and effects; they are related to the depletion of the power and authority of the nation-state, and involve the action of non-state actors. UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov said that, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking are undermining security in many regions and evolving into major threats to political and social stability, the rule of law, human rights and economic development.<sup>25</sup> The changing global economic environment has been utilized by drug traffickers to expand their activities and markets. Being highly mobile, they employ the best communications technology and thus succeed in moving their money around the world by electronic means. The result of such activity is severe, and most affected countries face high incidence of crime and violence.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, drug trafficking, trafficking in weapons, together with the transnational organised crime, are among the most serious transnational security threats.<sup>27</sup>

*Few threats to peace and survival of the human community are greater than those posed by the prospects of cumulative and irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which human life depends. True security cannot be achieved by mounting buildup of weapons (defence in a narrow sense), but only by providing basic conditions for solving non-military problems, which threaten them. Our survival depends not only on military balance, but on global cooperation to ensure a sustainable environment.*<sup>28</sup>

There is a direct relationship between environment and security: environmental degradation on the one hand and social disruption and conflict on the other, go hand in hand. The entire globe is suffering largescale environmental degradation and resource depletion that undercuts socio-economic security, further impacting traditional security concerns also.<sup>29</sup> Though conflict between states seems unlikely, environmental degradation may itself lead to social stress, communal strife, and political turbulence. The green movement, aimed at safeguarding the environment, which in its contemporary avatar emerged in the 1960s, is the third global discourse, which targets the identification of a new approach for the international community. Scholars like Rachel Carson, writing in the 1960s, brought forth the problem of human-generated environmental degradation to global attention.<sup>30</sup> In the 1970s, there was a dynamic response to this issue: the Stockholm Conference, which centralized the matter as a global agenda, and which resulted in the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme, NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Numerous national level environmental protection agencies were established, and several multilateral environmental agreements were negotiated and ratified.

The linkage between the terrorism and the crimes at the global levels bring into mind the conflict, which exist between the nation states and the non-states at the international level. The flexibility of the criminal activities at the global level and their operations are so highly widespread for the nation to control. International terrorist attacks, for example 9/11, showed that terrorist could use 'globalisation' to strike forcefully.<sup>31</sup> The financial dimension of the organised crime are of same proportions to that of terrorism that its difficult to differentiate between the two. Indeed, the financial flows linked terrorist activities are often

very low and remain below the thresholds of control mechanisms within financial institutions, whereas the financial dimension of organised crime is huge.<sup>32</sup> The primary motivation of terrorists is altruistic, motivated by a higher cause or ideology that is greater than his or her personal impulses or gains. A terrorist (or at least the entity that recruited the individual) will act for the furtherance of an external cause (whether it be a localised secessionist movement or global jihad) and for the benefit this has to both the cause and the people of it. The real motivation behind a terrorist is way beyond a rivalry bordering the conducts of the life and the rewards in after life.<sup>33</sup>

The definition of terrorism excludes the state induced terrorist tactics to control the citizens. The two major necessities for the terrorism involve the motives and the reliance of the terrorism group to use violence against the people and government. The people can be affected by various methods the terrorist employ for example assassination etc.<sup>34</sup> The phenomenon of terrorist has been prevalent even before the Cold War, which sparked immense international media attention during the late 1960s and early 1970. The terrorist activities involved murder, hijacking, hostage taking, these are not normal interstate war.<sup>35</sup> The prominent threat to international security in the recent times has been terrorism and its transnational dimensions. Paul Wilkinson was among the first scholars to study and conceptualise the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism. He viewed political terrorism as “the use of coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals for political motives.”<sup>36</sup> This distinction was widely accepted by scholars during the Cold War.

Domestic terrorism affects the locals of the country, whereas the transnational terrorism spreads across international boundaries.<sup>37</sup> Prior to 9/11 the government recognized the growing threat of international and domestic terrorism. There was a belief that West Germany’s Red army factions were co-operating with European and Middle East based counterparts. And many domestic terrorist groups were drawing support from moral and material from other states.<sup>38</sup> Gaddafi’s Libya had supplied the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) with area and ammunitions through the years of 1970 and 1980. Post Cold war, U.S did the assessing of its security risk and challenges to itself and to the entire western world, and concluded in no uncertain terms that the greatest risk to them were from the smaller more amorphous sources, such as regional states seeking weapons of mass destruction. The main agenda behind them would be gain political power through malicious acts of terrorism<sup>39</sup>. The increasing interests in the study of international terrorism post 1990’s has been due to the affect of 9/11 on the societies all over the world. The attack resulted in killing of over three thousand people, along with the financial repercussions of \$80 to \$90 billion, which were higher than any cased due to a natural disorder.<sup>40</sup>

The events of 9/11 sparked fierce debate among scholars as to the implications of the events for international security and the threat of transnational terrorism. For example, IR scholar Steve Smith argued that the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11 2001 had major implications for security analysis. Some of the key implications are: (a) states are no longer, if they ever were, the key actors in international arenas; (b) the future world order will be marked by asymmetrical conflict in which the weapons of the power will no longer automatically defeat the weapons of the weak; (c) the future world order is characterised by virtual war, a war in which the propaganda battle is as (if not more) important

than the military campaign; and (d) the events shatter the key assumption of many proponents of globalization that the conveyor belt of economic development and the spread of liberal democracy were in some way inevitable, irreversible and universal.<sup>41</sup>

The changing security perceptions in the West over the past two decades have been conceptualised by Tunander (Tunander, 1997) as a shift from a “Friend-Foe” to a “Cosmos-Chaos” divide. During the Cold War period, Tunander argues, the bipolar divide between the “Free World” and the “Evil Empire” structured security perceptions. The US-led “war on terrorism” targets not only “Chaos” (“rogue regimes” or “failed states”), but also a new major “Foe”: transnational Islamist terrorism. Replacing the “old” external threat of communism, Islamist fundamentalism was signaled as a major threat to European identity.<sup>42</sup> The terrorist attacks in London and Madrid followed by the Twin Tower attack, impacted the security agendas of the European government, their fears and awareness got heightened due to the breach in the security.<sup>43</sup> The prevention measures aims at the restrictions of the attacks following 9/11 and developing infrastructure in accordance to the measure.<sup>44</sup> The contemporary EU discourse on terrorism is moving from state-based terrorism to transnational terrorism, from organised terrorist groups to terrorist networks, and from anti-terrorism to a ‘war on terrorism’.<sup>45</sup> The transnational network of organized crimes on the Americans and Europeans soil, poses a huge national and international threat to security. The debate of security of individual and state perpetuate from there, leading to the global economy and its crisis.<sup>46</sup> Policy perceptions of terrorism have also been moving away from state-based terrorism to transnational terrorist networks. Pre Cold war era hardly noticed any serious discussion on transnational terrorism but the subsequent threat to security of nation states has made it a highly important topic of debate and discussions.<sup>47</sup>

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