

## **Foreign policy of South Africa: Theoretical framework**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

A key element of this Discussion is the concept of foreign policy of South Africa. This paper describes about short history of South Africa and then explained important features of South Africa's foreign policy in the apartheid. Further, paper has highlighted some important points of foreign policy of South Africa, South Africa after apartheid, and changes of foreign policy after apartheid then tried to give it Foreign Policy in Theoretical Framework.

#### **Brief history of South Africa :**

Apartheid in South Africa boiled down to the number of laws that permitted the ruling white community to isolate and intimidate the Africans, Asians and the mixed race from inhabiting South Africa. It deprived black people and minor community of Africa from the basic human rights and political rights. The people who were non whites were oppressed beyond limit and their lives were isolated. Africa's white minority were enjoying the maximum privileges and the black majority were denied income, education, and housing, in 1948, the National Party (NP) came to power on an electoral platform of apartheid, and moved rapidly in enacting a policy of racial segregation into law. In 1948 the South African government decided, "Black people, white people and Indians in South Africa must not live together. Black South Africans had nothing."<sup>1</sup>

At the foreign policy level, Afrikaners control over the state involved a redefinition of South Africa's relation to the commonwealth which revolved around the growing commitments of British to the decolonisation of her dependencies. Pre-war foreign relation had been dominated by two conflicting traditions.

After the National Party gained power in South Africa in 1948, its all-white government immediately began enforcing existing policies of racial segregation under a system of legislation that it called apartheid.

Rioting began in Soweto on 16 June 1976. The riots spread and they continued into 1977. In 1978 P W Botha became prime minister. He was determined to continue apartheid and in 1983 he introduced a new constitution with a tri-cameral parliament, with houses for whites, coloured and Indians (with no representation for blacks). However the new constitution pleased nobody. Meanwhile other countries were increasingly imposing economic sanctions on South Africa and inside the country resistance to apartheid grew.<sup>2</sup>

The nationalists conducted a vigorous campaign. They dropped secession as issue by pledging not to move in this direction until the people had declared by a decisive vote in a special referendum that they desired a Republic. South Africa had long been dominated by the National Party, under Malan, Sridler, Verwoerd and Vorster. The nationalists made racial policy the chief issue in the campaign, using for the first time the term apartheid to describe their policy of segregation.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Important features of South Africa's foreign policy in the apartheid :**

During this period, South African foreign policy generally displayed the following main characteristics:

- With the aim of better cooperation with non-separatist, anti-ban and non-communist states and international organizations, strengthening the position of SA for western countries and stressing on international trade and commerce to fight isolation.
- Peaceful co-existence and regional co-operation founded on geographical realities and driven by the need to foster friendly relations with neighboring states, seeing the country as part of the African continent (though with a permanent white population).
- External justification to enhance SA's image abroad and the maintenance of internal sovereignty by refraining from interference in the domestic affairs of other states (based on Article 2(7) of the UN Charter).<sup>4</sup>

In most respects, apartheid was a continuation, in more systematic and brutal form, of the segregationist policies of previous governments. A new concern with racial purity was apparent in laws prohibiting interracial sexual activities and provisions for population registration requiring that every South African be assigned to one discrete racial category or another.<sup>5</sup>

In 1989, Botha was forced from the office. He was replaced by Willem de Klerk, who promised to end apartheid in 1990. He also released Nelson Mandela. The De Klerk presented a new constitution with the rights for everyone. The first democratic election took place in April, 1994 and was elected president of Nelson Mandela in May 1994. He retired in 1999.

#### **South Africa after Apartheid :**

By 1989 it was becoming clear to the leadership of the NP that negotiations with the ANC were the only way to find a political solution that would reduce the country's descent in to violence, economic stagnation and social disintegration.

In August 1989, the leadership of the NP forced PW Botha to step down and FW de Klerk became president. He immediately began secret discussions about negotiations prospect with Nelson Mandela, who was still in prison, while the ANC, responded by issuing a set of preconditions for talks). In February 1990 FW de Klerk released Mandela and banned the ANC, SACT the PAC and other political organization, but it was not until June that the state

emergency was lifted.<sup>6</sup> It was also a challenge and an opportunity for the international community as a whole especially in the post-cold war situation. Mandela left prison in 1990. He became head of the ANC. South Africa, having become a republic, had to apply for sustained affiliation of the commonwealth.

In 1980, South Africa was isolated, but post-apartheid era started a new beginning for South Africa. The end of apartheid had a deep influence on the foreign policy of South Africa. In the period of Globalization bipolarity firstly was changing into interdependent, environment which also made impact on each nation's foreign policy. South Africa has gradually tried to improve their political condition. South Africa played a major role in making the contours of security, cooperation and development in much of the sub-Saharan region. However, others believed that new South Africa authority in region would promote peace and development. Van Heerden and Mbeki had talked about the vision of peaceful and non-exploitative relations of South Africa with their neighbours. According to Mbeki post imperialist society would be free from conflict and disagreement because there would be general understanding on matter of development, ideology, resources, distribution. New political development also implemented a major foreign policy review of 1989, which is known as 'New Diplomacy'<sup>7</sup>.

#### **Future Foreign Policy of South Africa :**

The pillars of South Africa's future foreign policy had been enunciated by Mandela in late 1993, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*.<sup>8</sup> These principles are the promotion of human rights and democracy; respect for justice and international law in interstate relations; the achievement of peace through "internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes"; incorporation of African concerns and interests into foreign policy choices; and economic development based on "cooperation in an interdependent world." In Southern Africa, he denounced South Africa's earlier economic domination of the region and its deliberate destabilization of neighbouring states. Instead, Mandela called for "cooperation in regional construction, infrastructure and resource development projects in virtually every sector and area. Finally, He advocated the full reintegration of South Africa into global trade networks."<sup>9</sup>

For President Nelson Mandela, the democratization and South Africa's national interests were inextricably intertwined. Mandela's democratic opinions were echoed by his foreign minister at the eleventh conference of the Non- Aligned Movement in [Ciano] in June 1994 that "human right are the cornerstone of our government policy and we shall not hesitate to carry the message to the far corners of the world. We have suffered too much ourselves not to do so".<sup>10</sup> Naturally, Declaration of human rights protection and the future of South Africa's foreign policy were first announced in the first debate. Nelson Mandela, the leader of ANC, then set the tone for the shape and conduct of South African diplomacy in the consequences of apartheid. He declared South Africa's foreign policy discussion document that laid down the basic principles in 1996. These were the following:

- A commitment to the promotion of human rights;
- A Commitment to the promotion of democracy worldwide;
- A commitment to justice and international law the conduct of relations between

nations;

- A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflict;
- A commitment for the continent of Africa;
- A commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation in an interdependent world.<sup>11</sup> After the end of apartheid in South Africa, the change was assured. When Mandela was declared the President, he was added to South Africa's foreign policy to ensure certain principles.

Pretoria displayed worry over human rights and democratization. Anti-apartheid movement was the most significant human rights movement of the post-world war II era. Human rights were the light that guided South Africa's foreign policy. In the realm of general disarmament and arms control, South Africa helped to bring about an indefinite extension to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. South Africa was also involved in economic development through regional and international co-operation. The focal point of the South African foreign policy in the post-apartheid period was in the region itself. This had become important because of economic and political revival of Africa. South African economy took full advantage of the apartheid and Cold War sanction against foreign investment. Exports to Africa included mainly value added goods and had recorded significant annual increases.<sup>12</sup> Presently the balance of trade was in favour of South Africa. The co-operation between Africa and African countries had covered areas like banking, mining, retail and insurance sectors as well. South Africa had competitive advantage of geographic location and knowledge of conditions in Africa.

All member states of the SADC, including South Africa, acknowledge that trading blocs were becoming a more important part of the world trading system. Hence, regional integration of Southern Africa, building on the foundation of the SADC, was deemed essential to avoid marginalisation. However, formidable obstacles may impede achievement of this goal. First, a successful strategy of regional integration required the creation of competent and legitimate government in both Angola and Mozambique following the conclusion of civil war. Second, the sheer weight of South Africa as a regional power and its ability to attract foreign investment and trade threatened to widen the economic gulf between Pretoria and its neighbours. Third, South Africa had obvious advantages in terms of infrastructure with which weaker neighbours would have to compete. Fourth, the issue of refugees from Africa tried forcibly to repatriate them. There were some 50,000 refugees from Mozambique in South Africa and their return would put huge strains on the former economy.<sup>13</sup>

There could be a conflict of interest between competing trade agreements. Understanding was needed between the objective of the preferential trade area in southern and eastern Africa and the South African custom union (SACU) which provides free trade between South Africa Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia.<sup>14</sup> South Africa included regional institute in Africa for the African agenda, South Africa customs (SACU) and SADC to strengthen the union and continentally the African Union.

### **Changes in the Post Apartheid Era:**

- The 1994 democratic elections in South Africa changed South African politics

tremendously. Since its start, the new government confirmed the main aim was the creation of new domestic political and socioeconomic structures, but it also initiated changes in the area of foreign policy. Regarding Pretoria's Africa policy, confrontation could finally be replaced by cooperation. Such cooperation became possible once South Africa had abolished its apartheid policy. It additionally improved once the Cold War had ended.

- After the end of apartheid, Mandela adopted the new foreign policy. His policies were based on idealistic principle. Mandela had established full diplomatic relation with UN, the OAU and SADC. Mandela adopted the human rights approach in his country's foreign policy.

- According to the Mandela, human right is the light of the foreign policy for development of South Africa. After 1994, South Africa re-entered in the world arena because South Africa remained distant from the world for several decades as a result of apartheid policy. The period of 1990-1994 was the new era of international engagement for South African politics as South Africa slowly tried to improve its political condition. When Mandela became the President at that time, he had no experience of enforcing a new foreign policy.<sup>15</sup>

- Mandela redefined the foreign policy after the transitional period of 1990-1994. He had faced many problems to make the new government. He had faced many difficulties, such as socio-economic, inequality and poverty, etc. So he laid emphasis on new issues after apartheid. There were new issues in foreign policy such as to promote democracy, to promote economic, trade and human rights. President Mandela was a symbol of understanding and peace in that time.

- There is no evidence to suggest that a crucial change in racial ideology has influenced the government. And while these adjustments are in all likelihood to have some impact on South African society in the lengthy run, they appear unlikely to change the stability of power between blacks and whites or the direction of the ongoing country a list approach throughout the five-year life of P.W. Botha's recently elected government. Assuming that the power and the will of the government is not weakened through other means, most analysts count on it would take decades before blacks' higher upward mobility in industry and the military could be translated into an advantageous political bargaining capacity.<sup>16</sup>

There is no doubt that after the apartheid period the Constitution of South Africa believed in promoting constitutionalism, permanent democracy, peace, sustainable development and sustainability culture for South Africa and the continent. During apartheid period, the policy of South Africa was based on discriminatory policy. Under apartheid, freedom was limited in the form of union, speech movement, besides honor. South Africa has to create a stable policy for the above purpose<sup>17</sup>. It had to show good economic performance. Then only could South Africa become an engine for development. However, South Africa's new government was busy with the social and economic reconstruction. A peaceful end to apartheid, as it now seems, would take away this problem, as it would leave the economy intact for South Africa to justifiably play an important role within the sub-region, and the continent as a whole<sup>18</sup>.

The foreign policy decision-making process under the new South African government is mainly concerned with three areas;

- First the impact of military and civilian intelligence has been balanced by investment.
- Secondly, South Africa has changed in terms of decision-making. Apartheid regime's international isolation and the external contexts of the cold war and democracy in South Africa have been replaced by a globalized world.

- Third decision-making authority if the military importance of a highly centralized sequence an open and interactive relation between individual decision makers has shifted.<sup>19</sup>

South Africa's policy can be summed up as one that is based on a faith. "That the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbours in southern Africa". This policy "Rest on three pillars: Strengthening Africa's institutions continentally and regionally vis-à-vis the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); Supporting the implementation of Africa's socio-economic development programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); and, Strengthening bilateral political and socioeconomic relations by way of effective structure for a dialogue and cooperation".<sup>20</sup>

On assuming power, the ANC faced challenging task of interpreting the gains of liberation diplomacy into a pragmatic and principled foreign policy. It also had to stamp its own philosophical imprimatur on foreign policy and adapt in its own image the institutional building inherited from successive apartheid regions.<sup>21</sup> All this had changed. South Africa was now a democratic state, with a democratically elected parliament. Human right and racial equality were constitutionally protected and there was a new attitude towards international law.

International trade of South Africa also improved significantly since 1994. Many African countries privileged trade agreements, both regional and bilateral. Certain events like the case of 'Zaire' had raised considerable doubts about Pretoria's ability to influence events on the African continent. It raised doubts about the formulation and conduct of Pretoria's Africa Policy. In August 1994, when King Letsie III of Lesotho tried to oust Prime Minister Wtsu Mokhenle, Presidents of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe criticized it. When Nigeria hanged human rights activist Ken Saro-wiwo, South Africa strongly criticised it<sup>22</sup>.

In the domestic political outlook, since 1994 the South African government in its senior leadership had displayed a consistency to a sufficient degree. At present, South Africa is the major economic country in Africa. Significant however are the direct trading contacts between South Africa and its SADC neighbours, their use of South Africa's road and rail routes for trade outside to the area is even more significant. South Africa was the major supplier of petroleum and electricity in the four countries, like Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and Mozambique.<sup>23</sup>

### **Post- Mandela Period :**

In the post Mandela period South Africa had following these things, first, South Africa prioritises anti-racism and anti-Western imperialism, which it regards as inextricably linked to racism. From this flows South Africa's desire to express solidarity with countries of the South and to secure the economic development, and overcome negative images of, Africans. Second, Within Africa, South Africa aspires to play a (if not the) leading role, promoting ambitious plans for African unity and an African Renaissance by, inter alia, strengthening or establishing continental institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African

Development Community (SADC), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Standby Force. Third, South Africa strongly supports state sovereignty and multilateralism, urging that external interventions in sovereign states only be undertaken under the aegis of the UN or regional organisations such as the AU or SADC. Fourth, South Africa also strongly advocates the use of non-violence and diplomacy to resolve interstate disputes, rather than armed force or even measures such as sanctions.<sup>24</sup>

South Africa cites its own experience of a negotiated transition from white-ruled oligarchy to democracy as a model of the effectiveness of diplomacy and urges this approach be applied elsewhere, for example, in Sudan, the Comoros and Zimbabwe. And fifth, South Africa subscribes to the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance, holding up as models its own 1996 post-apartheid constitution and the AU's innovative African Peer Review Mechanism, whereby African states undertake to monitor their own adherence to these principles.<sup>25</sup>

When Mbeki became the president after Mandela, he focused on development of South Africa. He had faced problems like corruption, AIDS, and Zimbabwe problem. During the tenure of Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa made their way into the SADC, NAM, and UN. Thabo Mbeki during the Mandela administration in effect when he was Vice President of the country's prime minister made a formal title. Domestic policies of ANC's post-apartheid government first emerged in the development, employment and redistribution strategy (GEAR) was included. Nelson Mandela stepped down as President of the ANC at the party's national congress in December 1997, when Thabo Mbeki supposed the mantle of leadership. Mbeki won the presidency of South Africa when national elections in 1999, when the ANC won just back of a two-thirds majority in Parliament.<sup>26</sup> President Mbeki shifted the main focus of state from reconciliation to transformation, significantly on the economic front.

After the apartheid, South Africa understood that if they want social and economic development in the country then they had to keep, a peace and stability in the country. Political development could be possible only with a harmonious relationship within the country. South Africa focused on both economic and political integration and pursued both political and economic development goals. South Africa adopted the regional and continental integration objective. Since 1994, South Africa established a strong commitment to promoting the Comfort of Africa. During the Mandela years, the "African agenda" was tense "good neighbourliness" and "Non-hegemonic" relations with fellow African states; under the Mbeki presidency, policy continued to highlight a non-hegemonic posture. Major goals of the African agenda continued to be of peace in African continent.<sup>27</sup> South Africa was an interlocutor; both forms government and private sector also played an important role in 16 interventions and simplified Burundi, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and others. Foreign policy was harnessed to assist in the following areas:

- First, South Africa should build up its investment and trade as a vehicle for creating more jobs. This required a more prioritised economic diplomacy that identified key economic partners and provided the organisational resources to implement it effectively. This was recognised in the Polokwane resolutions.
- Second, it should reoccupy the moral high ground of democracy and human rights at the level of citizens and human security as this had been the basis of much of South Africa's

good international reputation and its seat at global tables.

– Third it should contribute to peace, security and reconstruction on the continent because South Africa had substantial soft and hard infrastructure. It would also assist South Africa's own developmental imperatives and external perceptions of its backyard as something more than a 'lost continent'.<sup>28</sup> Doing so required a commitment of appropriate resources for mediating interventions in conflicts where it believed it can make a real difference and where it had real interests, such as the DRC. (For example, should South Africa continue to attempt to play a role in the Middle East?)

South Africa needed to cooperate with the every state that was targeted by its democratization doctrine. For example, in order to make progress in the southern African development community (SADC). South Africa had to cooperate with Zimbabwe, yet it also desperately needed to pursue democratization in that country in order to prevent what is left of democracy from falling apart. South Africa had gone from being an international pariah to democratize and peacemaker. It had become a leading player in the endeavours to settle African regional conflict.<sup>29</sup> During and even after his presidency, Mandela was revered throughout the world as a symbol of "peace and reconciliation". They so eagerly believed in the theory of "democratic peace" "south African leaders have by promoting democracy in Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Nigeria, Sudan, the Comoros, and of course the DRC. South Africa's credibility as an agent of democratization had additionally been undermined by its perceived insensitivity to the implications of its economic domination. It would be way easier for South Africa to play the role of regional democratization if it pursued a lot of hospitable economic policies regarding its poorer and weaker neighbours. Indeed, South Africa's own democratization that started at the start of the last decade created the hope and expectation that the once-belligerent "giant" would become a constructive and benign hegemon in economic in addition as political matters.<sup>30</sup>

In April 2004, the ANC won almost seventieth of the national vote, and Mbeki was re-elected for his second 5 year term. In his 2004 State of the state address, Mbeki promised his government would scale back poverty, stimulate economic growth, and fight crime.

Recognising the importance of political and economic stability on the continent for prosperity and for South Africa's own success, the Mbeki government worked to secure both. In the economic terrain, the government saw a crucial role for the private sector in Africa's regeneration (especially in post-conflict states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) and business was ascribed a key role in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Clearly, this approach was not motivated solely by altruism. After 1994 South African business needed little encouragement to begin investing in the rest of the continent. The government was broadly supportive of this although it adopted a hands-off approach by not extending active financial support to companies seeking to invest in the region. Sensitivity to criticism by other African states of South African corporate 'arrogance' saw the government advocating the establishment of a code of conduct for companies.<sup>31</sup>

Following the ANC's win within the 2009 national election Jacob Zuma became the third president of South Africa in 2009. The Zuma administration's foreign policy will be determined to a greater extent by the struggle to satisfy national needs and demands. The Zuma administration will be a substantial and welcome addition to the struggle against Africa's



problems.

**The foreign policy issues :**

South Africa's Foreign Policy White Paper 2011 which highlights the purpose and objectives of South Africa's foreign policy has echoed the above mentioned principles, highlighting once again key elements. These include:

- addressing shared challenges of underdevelopment;
- promoting global equity and social justice
- with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world;
- and doing our part to strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation,
- Reflecting the diversity of our nations, and ensuring its centrality in global governance.

In the last twenty years of South Africa's democracy, there has been a continuation in the pursuit of these foreign policy objectives, with a focus on relations with South Africa with the African continent and a greater focus on the country's goal of achieving peace and security.<sup>32</sup>

South Africa two-year non-permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat of the emerging South African government has set up his tenure as a critical success. South Africa in the UN Security Council elections, the votes garnered in support of his candidacy. But if South Africa does not want to become "just another country" in Africa, Zuma needs to demonstrate that global leadership entails rising above pressures to kowtow to bloc sentiments. Maintaining soft power will require South Africa to take risks and hold unpopular regional or even global positions. That means representing independence by deciding whether to grant the Dalai Lama a visa, give Mugabe another chance, or host Fidel Castro, not based upon conformity, but on merit. In a word, South Africa will have to answer, at last, to its own uncertain identity.<sup>33</sup>

President Zuma has actively sought for South Africa to play an increasing role in world economic fora. The country is a member of the G20, and was invited in late 2010 by China to join the BRIC. There is no doubt that South Africa's acceptance as the fifth member of the world's emerging economies' club, BRICS, is a foreign policy coup for President Zuma (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), a formation of major emerging market economies.

Jacob Zuma has clarified south Africa's foreign policy in keeping with him foreign policy based mostly on four pillar that is that the African agenda, south-south co- operation, north south dialogue, multilateral and economic display, and bilateral relation with individual countries. Jacob Zuma centred on that multilateralism and international problem through international organisations like the UN, instead of through individual nations was a key foreign policy for South Africa. In keeping with the Zuma when engaged on the four pillars, however he said our primary focus remains the African continent. South Africa has laborious relation with African countries in SADC and beyond that date back to the times of the liberation struggle, when South Africans were offered shelter and solidarity to dismantle colonial operation and apartheid.<sup>34</sup> The BRIC cluster of the world's key rising economics.

Constraints of South Africa foreign policy towards the African economic are, particularly with regard to perception versus reality of its economic and political hegemony and also as

its complicated identity as a nation Mbeki when became the president was among the foremost effective marketers of the concept of an African renaissance that needed for its successes the each African's own commitment to vary and conjointly the support of the north. Yet, while the interests of his own domestic constituency naturally come first on the list of priorities for his administration, Jacob Zuma takes on the formidable task of succeeding a "foreign policy" president and an architect of Africa's continental institutions notably the African Union (AU), New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its flagship good governance initiative, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).<sup>35</sup> Africa under Zuma is likely to remain a strong proponent and financial supporter of this network of institutions, which are themselves undergoing marked transformation.

To begin with, there are few indications of a dramatic change of guard within South Africa's Foreign Affairs Department, where Zuma's former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is Foreign Minister. Under Dlamini-Zuma's leadership, South Africa has pursued a consistently pan-African approach to its relations with the rest of the continent - which some decode as showing solidarity with other African leaders, contributing to the mediation of conflict and promoting an "African" agenda in international forums such as the United Nations and the G8. As South Africans struggle over a future under Jacob Zuma, Yet, for South Africa's allies in the West who have struggled to reconcile Mbeki's foreign policy decisions on human rights with Mandela's legacy that placed human rights at its core, the hope may be that there will be a markedly different foreign policy response to hot button human rights issues.<sup>36</sup>

### **Foreign policy in theoretical framework :**

Nationalism and communism are examples of ideologies with an explicit idealistic content in that both are dynamic philosophies offering would-be supporters radical and often mythical interpretation of their past; analysis of present discontents. However, for the purposes of this analysis, idealism will be equated with one particular ideology, namely liberalism. This is essentially a Western philosophical construct concerned to promote the value of democratic self-determination, together with the economic and social goals derived from the organisation of a free market economy. More precisely in the realm of international relations, we shall be concerned with the notion of liberal internationalism principally associated with improving the prospects for global peace and security and at the same time securing justice for oppressed peoples. Orthodox liberals eschew revolutionary means to achieve such goals. Liberalism, unlike its dynamic counterpart, is a relatively static doctrine eschewing transformational means to utopian ends, but nevertheless appealing to disenfranchised communities. It has as we shall see become increasingly powerful especially since the end of the Cold War and the discrediting of the theory and application of Communist ideology in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe.<sup>37</sup>

There are generally two important theoretical views to understand foreign policy. The first concept is realism, which are international relations principle used to give an explanation for the conduct of states in the international arena. It is the pre-eminent and dominant paradigm that is employed to explain, inter -state relations. The second main theoretical perspective used to understand foreign policy is liberalism. This viewpoint paints a friendlier picture of foreign policy in the international arena. A key assumption of liberalism is the trust in

development in the worldwide arena.<sup>38</sup> The notion of national interest in International Relations has been used to explain the behaviour of states in a threatening global environment.

The liberal stresses the worth and complete demand for the emergence of a system of worldwide governance to manage the complicated relations of states at a range of levels political, economic, social, technological and legal. Certainly, during this read, liberals typically claim that the notion of sovereign statehood could be a declining quality as governments progressively have to be compelled to agitate the ever-increasing pressure of economic process.

Nelson Mandela's principle that the 'new' South Africa's foreign policy had to be primarily protection and statement of human rights; that poorer neighbours had to be treated with sympathy and admiration. In the hands of the apartheid regime in analyzing his experience was hardly surprising. Nelson Mandela foreign policy might be related with liberal theory notion. After the become president, Mandela had changes their economic and foreign policy with their neighbour as well as Africa. Mandela's idealistic policy helps to connect South Africa with other world. It can see in the Mandela period (1994-1999) that gradually economic development happened. After the end of apartheid Mandela adopted the new foreign policy. His policy was based on idealistic principle.<sup>39</sup>

One perceptive explanation for this departure from Mandela's initial emphasis on human rights-based foreign policy is offered by *The Economist* arguing that 'South Africa's ambivalent sense of identity, with one foot in the rich world, where its main economic interests continue to lie, and the other in the poor one, with which many of its people identify.'<sup>40</sup> Mandela had established full diplomatic relation with UN, the OAU and SADC. Mandela adopted the human right. According to the Mandela; human right is the light of the foreign policy for development of South Africa. After the 1994 South Africa had re-entry in the world because South Africa had left behind the world from several decades because of apartheid policy. Mandela adopted the new foreign policy because South Africa had left behind after apartheid.

It is widely acknowledge that it was through his leadership that South Africa managed a successful and peaceful transition. South Africa acceded multilateral organisation, including UN, SADU, OAU, SACU, NAM etc. Nelson Mandela saw an Africa where apartheid would finally be abolished and every man would be free and equal in the eyes of the Nation. We can see that after the apartheid South Africa have been changed. Mandela's policy was the miracle for the South Africa to development. In the apartheid period had really intolerable for black people. But in the 1994 South Africa was independent after much struggle.<sup>41</sup> We can't say that in the 1994 South Africa became a state because South Africa was state that time when it had struggling in apartheid. South Africa has got freedom from white people and colonial. This was the first domestic election in April, 1994 Mandela become the president Mandela accepted the many policy like SACU, SADC, UN and OAU for development of South Africa country. Mandela included the promotion of democracy worldwide, the respect for human and the rule of law, peace and cooperation between states.

The blocking version of the existence of white minority realism at all costs was given in the words of Nelson Mandela in 1994 for the liberal definition of national interest, that 'human rights will be light, which will guide our foreign affairs'. Indeed, how can this be according to the world's expectations, which state can be accomplished by which the ANC

leadership had long and hard to get rid of their country of a liberal and oppressive rule? Thus it is mandatory for the protection and promotion of human rights to begin with at least the policy, whenever and wherever it is in danger and with the domestic aspirations as well as to remove the differences of apartheid from the book of law And to make laws for economic and social reconstruction, there was a 'new' South Africa. This liberal consistency between domestic and external policy might be described as an overall strategy of enlightened national self-interest with little scope for the more orthodox cold-blooded tenets of realism as guides to policy making.<sup>42</sup>

All these good liberal causes were assisted by the fact that the country, freshly liberated from the scourge of apartheid, had a basic of justice, not different those other good citizens of international society.

No single theory reliably explains the wide range of international interactions, but one theoretical framework has historically held a central position in the study of IR. Modern realist theory developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists called idealism. Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organization, rather than power alone, as key influences on events. Idealists think that human nature is basically good. They see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. Realists ground themselves in a long tradition.<sup>43</sup>

South Africa has had three Presidents since Independence and they all were from the African National Congress (ANC). Mbeki's foreign policy, reflecting a mixture of principle and pragmatism, aimed at making an impact on the world order, because he felt the need to a reform of this system. However Mbeki recognized that such an outcome won't simply happen from either appeasement or delinking from the international system. Instead he recognized the requirement to interact with this world order to reform it. But Mbeki's stand toward his troubled neighbour in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has drawn strong criticism from the international community.<sup>44</sup>

Realists are concerned with order, power, and the 'national interest. Realists in support of the doctrine of state primacy point to its role in agenda setting in debate whether on trade, multi-lateral intervention, or climate change in international organisations.

Realism does, therefore, have a capability to acclimatize to different circumstances. Thus the notion of the nationwide interest the bedrock of realism is not repaired and unchanging, except insofar as the survival of the state is the key variable. How that interest is assisted will count on how states adapt to altering circumstances and re-define the utility and the means needed to fight back and claim that overarching interest in survival. And the reality of this proposition is best summed up by Bruce Miller: 'National concerns cannot be separated from the minds of the men who formulate them concepts of national interest have a grounding in the details of geography and economics, but these components are subject to change ultimately, ideas of nationwide interest depend upon the ideas which men have of the location which they would like their country to live at in the world; and these concepts change in time, apart from not ever being agreed within a homeland at a granted time'.<sup>45</sup>

Thus whether the 'new' South Africa remains an inspirational example as perceived by many at its birth in 1994 or has, in effect, become 'just another country' is perhaps too sharp a dichotomy. True, it is a member of the G20; true it aspires to a permanent seat on a

reformed United Nations Security Council, but its record in foreign policy, as we have tried to show, is by no means inspirational in orthodox ethical terms. Perhaps the best that can be said is that South Africa has become 'just another country' facing the same dilemmas in foreign policy as most other states, having to choose between evils rather than basing policy on moral absolutes, Realism rules.<sup>46</sup>

Cornerstone of specific theoretical approaches, they neither acted consistently according to the assumptions of idealism or realism that are ascribed to them. The deduction drawn is thus that categorising the foreign principles of leaders Mandela and Mbeki as idealist and realist, respectively, outcomes in a simplistic comprehending of the perspectives that announce these two statesmen, as well as the complexity of components involved in foreign policy making. More considerably, it is unhelpful in evolving a better comprehending of South Africa's foreign principle in the post-1994 period.<sup>47</sup>

Jacob Zuma, voted into office as head of the ANC in late 2007, weathered a series of corruption charges and was chosen by the ANC dominated parliament after the 2009 elections to serve as the country's newest President. Zuma's economic policy seems to be fairly close to socialism. Jacob Zuma is a very different compared to Mbeki. His ambitions for Africa or for changing the global order for that matter are more modest.

Zuma described that the country's foreign policy is founded on "four pillars". First, priority is accorded to Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Africa. He said "We work with countries of the developing south to address shared challenges of underdevelopment". Secondly, South Africa seeks to promote global equity and Thirdly, South Africa recognises the significance of the "developed North" in forging. The last tenet of South Africa's foreign policy stresses a desire to revise the balance of power on the international stage. One of the unique differences between Zuma's approach to foreign policy and that of his predecessor Mbeki is that Zuma does not seem to be making an attempt to create a "Zuma Doctrine".<sup>48</sup>

Mbeki positively was trying to make a broader principle beyond South Africa's national concerns primarily based on the conceptual notion of the African renaissance. Zuma appears more centered on SA's needs and furthermore the nationwide interest; though it's going to verify to be one amidst those odd things that will lead to narrowly defined policies.

Zuma committed Pretoria in supporting the AU's efforts of bringing peace, political reform, justice and human rights too many conflict affected countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Madagascar, Darfur and the crisis in Middle East etc. He also urged the international community to support these countries' quest for freedom, human rights and dignity. Jacob Zuma believed that "South Africa is now regarded by the international community as an honest and reliable peace broker," Zuma's rise to power finally has undermined the support of the one regional or ethnic African party as Zuma has proved engaging to Zulu-speaking voters. The key focuses of South Africa's foreign policy, the African Agenda, South-South Co-operation, North-South Dialogue, Multilateral and Economic Diplomacy, and bilateral relations with individual countries.<sup>49</sup>

Jacob Zuma became the third president of South Africa in 2009. Zuma's economic policy appears to be fairly near socialism. His ambitions for Africa or for changing the world order for that matter can possibly be slighter. Jacob Zuma outlined the South African

democracy in his own approach and he refused to spot South Africa's Constitution because of the primary set of values and principles. Jacob Zuma was completely different compared to Mbeki.

One of the distinctive variations between Zuma's approach to foreign policy which of his predecessor Mbeki is that Zuma looked at additional targets of South Africa's desires and additionally the national interest though it's about to convince be one amongst those odd things that may result in narrowly outlined policies<sup>50</sup>. Mbeki completely was attempting to create a broader policy beyond South Africa's national interests based totally on the conceptual notion of the African renaissance.

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