

Wittgenstein: The Concept of Thought or *Gedanke* in the Aftermath of Verification

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the concept of Thought or *Gedanke* in the philosophy of Wittgenstein in the later transitional phase, *i.e.*, from 1932 onwards till 1935 *i.e.* the run-up to the *Philosophical Investigations*. In this period Wittgenstein insists that philosophy consists in the dissolution of philosophical problems. He now turns to ordinary language where the meaning of a word is determined by the rules of its use. The ordinary view of understanding as a mental accompaniment to language is criticised. So is the belief that thinking is a mental process accompanying speech acts and endowing them with meaning. Although it generally appears that something mysterious and mental gives life to utterances, Wittgenstein says, if we had to name anything as the life of the sign, it would be its use. This paper attempts to bring out Wittgenstein's views regarding the concept of thought or *gedanke* and shows that his opinion about thought being non-psychological persists in this phase and there is continuity in this regard from the Tractarian days.

Key Words : Meaning, Mental, Language, Thought, Use, Wittgenstein

INTRODUCTION

Post 1932 a fresh Wittgenstein emerges who channelized his philosophical thinking into newer avenues. The primary literature that is available, including the lecture notes are no longer aphoristic but rather discursive. Some commentators consider *The Big Typescript (BT)* as marking the end of the transitional phase, since it contains his mature views. On the same grounds, the *BT* may be said to herald the beginning of what was to subsequently appear in the pen-ultimate work, the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*. It is the only work that represents a book format with contents and headings. The lecture notes taken by Wittgenstein's students from 1932 onwards, the *Blue Book*, dictated by Wittgenstein himself to five of his students during 1933-34 and the *Brown Book* dictated during 1934-35 to two of his students, Skinner and Ambrose, the *Philosophische Grammatik* composed during 1932-34 are all run-ups to

the final accomplishment, the *Investigations*. Of course, none of these works were planned for publication by the author and it is questionable whether he would have allowed them to be done so. Nevertheless, they are an important source of first-hand data about his thoughts on paper. It was in Norway that he began to write Part-I of the *PI*. Between 1934 and 1936, he wrote about private experience and sense – data which were delivered in lectures in 1936. In February 1939, Wittgenstein was elected to the Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge, succeeding Moore. He later joined Guy's Hospital, London as a hospital porter for voluntary war-service and followed it as a laboratory technician at New Castle in 1941. He returned to teaching in 1944. Wittgenstein delivered his last lectures in the Easter Term of 1947 after which he resigned for personal reasons.

Wittgenstein's fresh ideas were circulated in Cambridge and the rest of the world by his students. Philosophy, for Wittgenstein now consisted in the

dissolution of philosophical problems. Philosophical problems are due to grammatically alike expressions which have different uses and the error lies in considering them to be similar. Wittgenstein pointed out that the mistake made by philosophers, including Moore, is looking at language as a form of words rather than the use of the form of words¹. In the early transitional phase, Wittgenstein had stressed on verification and 'phenomenological' language, which describes the immediately given. The *Blue Book* introduces the concepts of language games, family resemblance and repudiates that language is a calculus of clearly defined rules. After 1932, Wittgenstein moved over to ordinary language, and considered the meaning of a word to be determined by the rules of its use. A paradigm shift is exclusive at this stage. Wittgenstein is no more speaking of 'the language' but rather of the multifarious uses of language. He attempts to drive the point that philosophical problems are due to a misinterpretation of our forms of language. It is ordinary language itself which is so much a part of our life about which Wittgenstein is now concerned. The common view of understanding being a mental accompaniment to language is brought under the hammer. Against it, he says understanding is an ability, where the meaning of a word represents how a word is used. The language game method shows language as a system of communication by means of which children learn their native language. This culminates in the private language argument in the *PI*, where he considers language to be a part of an activity of a form of life (*PI* 23).

This paper will focus on the concept of the *Gedanke* i.e. thought, prior to what appears in the *PI* and attempt to show if any connection can be traced to the Tractarian days. In this regard it will also discuss the concepts of meaning and understanding in the later transitional phase.

Section 1 : Meaning:

The early transitional Wittgenstein had espoused the principle of verification. During that phase, a proposition for him recorded a sense experience where the meaning of a proposition coincided with its truth. So, the meaning of a proposition depended on an empirical condition². This approach is now replaced with meaning as use. Wittgenstein's forsaking of verification is not very sharply asserted. In the *Lectures* of 1932-33, Wittgenstein says the question "How can one know a sentence?" can be translated as "What is its verification?" and goes on to say how a sentence can be verified shows its sense³.

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein refers to the rules of grammar in the context of a sentence making sense. Since rules of grammar refer to the use of a word⁴, we may deduce that Wittgenstein is replacing verification with the use of a word. This represents the paradigm shift. The point noteworthy is that the word 'verification' is no longer used frequently but rather 'use' in the context of meaning. The trademark, therefore, for the later transitional Wittgenstein is meaning as use⁵.

Wittgenstein begins his lectures of 1932-33 with the concept of use. He says the grammar of a word refers to the use of a word and "knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece", where knowing how to move a chess piece is not a particular state of mind occurring along with the game. Similarly, the meaning of a word can never be the feelings attached to a particular word. Moreover, an ostensive definition gives only one rule for the use of a word. If we explain the word 'red' by pointing to something, we are giving only one rule for its use and if one cannot point to something, rules of a different kind are given. There are various rules and together they constitute the meaning of a word. Two words can have the same meaning only if they have the same rules for their use⁶.

Against the ostensive definition of meaning, Wittgenstein says it is not really a definition at all. Moreover, the phrase "meaning of a name" is not the same as "bearer of a name;" the latter expression may be replaced by "Watson" unlike the former⁷. The *Blue Book (BB)* begins with an attack on the ostensive definition of meaning. Words like 'one', 'number', 'not', etc. do not have ostensive definitions. It is not necessary to look for an object which is to be regarded as the meaning of a word. This is evident if we consider the grammar of the expression "explanation of meaning" which will inform us about the grammar of the word "meaning"⁸. Wittgenstein says the use of words is analogous to the use of money. Words and their meanings are not like money and the things bought with money but rather like money and its different uses. Money is not always used to buy things which can be pointed to, e.g., when it buys the permission to sit in a theatre, so also is the case with words⁹. Therefore, says Wittgenstein, 'use of a word' can be substituted for 'meaning of a word'.

Wittgenstein goes on to say that words are used in a 'family of ways'. And words like 'beautiful', 'fire', are learnt normally as interjections by a child. Or the word 'good' is normally applied first to food together with

expressions of approval. The form of words is not important but the game in which the words appear¹⁰. In the *Blue Book* he writes:

But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we would have to say that it was its *use*¹¹.

In the *Blue Book* Wittgenstein speaks of the use of words in the context of language games. He says: "Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words¹²." He goes on to say that some words have clearly defined meanings, while others are used in numerous ways which gradually merge into one another. Therefore, we cannot give any strict rules for their use. In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein writes:

Knowing how a word is used = *being able* to use it¹³.

While describing meaning as use, Wittgenstein also points out what meaning is not. As early as in the *Lectures* of 1932-33, Wittgenstein clearly says that the meaning of a word can never be the feelings attached to a particular word¹⁴. Wittgenstein is flatly denying that any mental process occurs when we use a word. In the *BT*, he writes that it is a mistaken idea that the meaning of a word is a mental image that accompanies the word¹⁵. Elsewhere, he says meaning, interpretation, appear to be processes accompanying the pointing to an object and providing it with a soul, without which they would appear to be dead. Actually, understanding as a process is not our concern¹⁶. And we are generally inclined to call understanding a mental process or a state of mind.

A paradigm shift is exclusive at this stage. Wittgenstein is no more speaking of 'the language' but rather of the uses of language. He foregoes his former belief in the essence of language, the limits of language and replaces it with the multifarious uses of language and attempts to drive the point that philosophical problems are due to a misinterpretation of our forms of language.

Section 2 : Understanding:

In the *Lectures* of 1933-34, Wittgenstein says "understanding a word" is used in two ways. One as an accompanying mental process and the other for knowing the use of a word. But they have two different grammars. The grammar of "feeling something when we hear the word" is very different from "knowing the words use"¹⁷. Elsewhere Wittgenstein says that 'use of a word' can be substituted for 'meaning of a word'. So understanding a

word means knowing its use and its applications. Wittgenstein attacks the common notion of understanding as a subtle, hidden, mysterious process going on in an internal mysterious medium, the so-called mind. In the *Lectures* of 1933-35, Wittgenstein points out that although we suppose that in understanding a word, some image or if not something subtle occurs in the mind where the mind is a kind of storehouse, the fact remains that no such thing can be found. Moreover, it is also true that we can understand a word or sentence instantly without a corresponding process going on in the mind. Now if understanding is a process, the question arises – does it take place along with the words or afterwards? Actually this is not the case at all and this confusion can be disengaged if we take 'understanding a word' to mean 'being able to use it'. This would help to get rid of considering understanding as an accompanying process going on in the mind. This confusion generally arises because words are associated with images, though not always the correct image. Like for example, the word "red" conjures a red image, though we can also get a green image. Moreover, since we can speak without thinking like when we say something while thinking of something else *i.e.*, speaking without understanding, we are tempted to consider that speaking and understanding are two activities, occurring at the same time. Thus, says Wittgenstein, "Being able to use the word is not an *accompaniment* of the use, as understanding seems to be¹⁸." Wittgenstein very explicitly says the word "understanding" is used in two different ways. In the first case it refers to a process that accompanies hearing or uttering a word or sentence. In the second case "understanding" refers to being able to use a word. Wittgenstein points out that we hardly use the word "understanding" for a process accompanying uttered or heard words and in the vast majority of the cases the word is used to mean being able to do something.

Wittgenstein goes on to point out that it is due to the form of words in the expression "I understand" that it seems to describe a state, when in fact it does not do so. If we ask ourselves what happens when we understand, we remain dissatisfied by descriptions like bringing up images. Images are only symptoms of understanding. Wittgenstein says "The question, what *is* understanding?" or what is knowing how to use a word? is misleading. What one *can* describe is the use of the words "understanding" and "knowing"¹⁹.

Wittgenstein is of the opinion that words like "not"

and “understanding” are only indices and can alter the manner in which a sentence is used. “Not” functions as an index in “not-*Fx*” and changes the manner in which *Fx* is used²⁰.

Therefore, we see Wittgenstein making his point that the expression “in the mind” is the cause of confusion in philosophy. So long as we say that sensations may accompany understanding a word or sentence, we do not fall into error. But if we assert that such sensations are always present when we say a word or understand a sentence, we fall into error. It is wrong to assume such a case. Conscious mental acts do have a part in the process of understanding but it is never a necessary case. There are instances of understanding an idea or order without any conscious experience of any kind whatsoever. In the *Philosophical Grammar (PG)* Wittgenstein writes:

“Understanding a word” may mean: *knowing* how it is used; *being able to apply it*”²¹.

At the same time, Wittgenstein says the meaning of a word may be called the location of a word in Grammar²². Therefore, the formula we get is:

Meaning / Understanding / Thinking = Use of a word = Place in Grammar²³

Therefore, we see, Wittgenstein’s account of understanding during this phase is a non-psychological one. Understanding is not a particular experience that one undergoes when one utters or hears something. Understanding a word is rather an ability. Wittgenstein seems to point out that understanding may be manifested in varied and diverse behaviour. It may be that a variety of images or feelings or sensations may occur to me when I understand a word or a sentence, but they are by no means necessary and inevitable to understanding. So Wittgenstein is not rejecting mental accompaniments to understanding but only rebutting that they constitute understanding. In the *Lectures*, Wittgenstein says, understanding a word is an ability which may be manifested in three ways. Firstly, in how one uses the word; secondly in how one responds to its use by others; and thirdly in how one explains what it means when asked²⁴. Wittgenstein’s views may be summarised as: firstly, he argues that mental phenomena are not necessary for understanding. This in general is against the mentalist tradition. Secondly, Wittgenstein argues that mental phenomena are not a sufficient assurance for understanding. Thirdly, understanding is an ability; the capacity of using words in linguistic activities. There are no hard and fast rules, no unitary concepts, yet they are

circumscribed within the way of human life as lived by us.

Section 3 : Thinking and Speaking:

After 1932 as has already been observed, Wittgenstein emphatically disapproves of the common notion of meaning and understanding as independent processes taking place in the so-called mental medium of mind. This attack is also carried on against the commonly accepted notion of thinking as an ‘occult’ process, taking place in a ‘queer’ medium called the mind about which we really have no knowledge. Against what is generally understood to be an invisible and veiled process, Wittgenstein argues to establish the concept of thought or *Gedanke* as essentially far removed from any kind of mysticism.

In the *BB*, Wittgenstein states that it is a “general disease” to suppose all our acts as originating from a mental reservoir, the so-called mind²⁵. Elsewhere he points out the expression “in the mind” is the cause of enormous confusion in philosophy and the ‘occultness’ of thought or thinking is due to the supposition that it arises in an enclosed space, the head. In unequivocal terms, Wittgenstein states that it is misleading to consider thinking as a mental activity²⁶. The error of considering meaning or thinking as a peculiar mental act stems from the fact that we suppose it is connected with images and experiences of different kinds. We have a tendency to attribute the incomprehensible parts of thinking to processes occurring in an unseen and peculiar medium, the mind. This problem is due to a ‘muddle’ and the queer aspect of the mind is not of interest to philosophy but rather is a subject matter of the natural sciences.

We are prone to suppose that there are two worlds, says Wittgenstein. One is the mental, which we imagine to be kind of gaseous, or ethereal, and the other is the material world. It seems as if the former phenomena occur in “the upper strata of the atmosphere” in contrast to the latter which “happen on the ground”. It is also supposed that mental phenomena arise when the material phenomena undergo a stage of complexity. This problem of the mental and material could be raised in a question like “Is it possible for a machine to think?” This question is not analogous to for e.g. “Can a machine liquefy gas?” but rather it is like “Has the number 3 a colour?” which somehow seems nonsensical²⁷. Probably what Wittgenstein is here implying is that the term “thinking” is not used in respect of a machine, as far as usage is

concerned in our language; in fact, such a usage is not even allowed and hence it is nonsensical to use the term “think” in respect of a machine. But it may be argued that we do use the expressions “thought” and “mental processes” and ordinarily they do not seem to be nonsensical. So if we attribute “mental” to thinking, then why is it not allowed? Wittgenstein is nowhere saying that such a use is prohibited in our language. But his point is rather that such a use is not going to take us anywhere. The “mental” or “mind”, in so far as it is used in our language gives no satisfying knowledge of a substantive entity or process. They on the other hand are largely suggestive of mystical processes about which we know almost nothing.

According to Wittgenstein, expressions like “before the mind” or “in the mind” are used in a metaphorical sense. He points out that we are prone to suppose that when I say for e.g. “Mr. N. will come to see me” and mean it, I make a connection in my mind. This is partly responsible for making us suppose that meaning or thinking is a “peculiar mental activity”. But we must remember that when for e.g. I point to Mr. Smith and say “this is Mr. Smith” in order to explain the meaning of the word “Mr. Smith”, I do not make the connection by means of any mysterious or weird method. Nor is there any shady and queer mental act involved when I think of Mr. Smith even if he is not there.²⁸ Wittgenstein continues: “What makes it difficult to see that this is the connection is a peculiar form of expression of ordinary language, which makes it appear that the connection between our thought (or the expression of our thought) and the thing we think about must have subsisted *during* the act of thinking”²⁹. Wittgenstein prefers to interpret the expression “the object of our thought” as meaning “a thing I am thinking *about* and not “that which I am thinking”³⁰.

In order to remove the temptation of looking at thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc. as a mental process which is independent of the process whereby a thought, a hope, a wish etc. is expressed, Wittgenstein gives a rule of thumb: “If you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. The difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same time the whole point of it, is this: the expression of belief, thought, etc., is just a sentence; —and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system of language; as one expression within a calculus”³¹. And Wittgenstein emphatically asserts that we need not postulate an

unexplainable mental act along with our expressions. He goes on to point out that he is of course not denying that peculiar so-called mental phenomena may accompany the expressions of thoughts. But the bottom line is we need not say that they must accompany the expressions. It is an examination of the usages of words like “thinking”, “meaning”, “wishing”, etc. which enables us to throw away the mental aspect of such phenomena as a separate process from their expressions. So what is thinking? It could be just the experience of saying or speaking or could also be the experience of speaking with accompanying experiences³².

Therefore, it is only in a metaphorical sense that one can say thinking is an activity of the mind. Thinking, may be defined as the activity of operating with signs. Elsewhere in the *BB*, Wittgenstein points out that in saying an idea is before our mind, we are using a metaphor. Such expressions should not mislead us and is indicative of a wide variety of processes, more or less similar to each other. In the *PG*, he says thinking is operating with symbols and thinking is a “fluid concept” because each individual case has to be considered separately and if we say thinking is “operating with language”, then we must make note of the fact that language is a “fluid” concept³³. Wittgenstein goes on to consider particular cases of what are called ‘operating with signs’. He gives a simple example of operating with words. He says, supposing I order someone “fetch me six apples from the grocer”, and a description is given of making use of the order. A piece of paper with the words “six apples” written on it is given to the grocer who then matches the written words with one of the labels and counting six apples, puts them in a bag. This is nothing but a case of language game exemplifying the use of words. It is by means of language games that a child starts to use words. Studying language games, *i.e.* studying the primitive forms of language helps us to look at the simpler forms of thinking and in turn assists in overcoming the traces of mentalism enshrouding the use of ordinary language³⁴.

Wittgenstein further points out that we have an inane tendency to look for generality. This craving for generality “has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term”³⁵. So the grammar of words like “wishing”, “thinking”, “understanding”, “meaning” can be studied from a description of the various cases of wishing, thinking, etc.

There can be no definite features which would characterize all cases of the use of a word, e.g., “wishing”, for the use of a word cannot be circumscribed within well-defined boundaries.

So in thought or thinking we do not proceed according to strictly defined rules within a given perimeter; everything is open. To give a definition of the concept of thought, Wittgenstein focuses on how the word “thought” or “thinking” is used in ordinary language. He considers the use of other similar words in particular instances to show the changeable and shifting usage of words. There are no hard and fast rules for the use of a particular word – so is the case with the word “thought” or “thinking”. And we must not forget that the meaning of a word, *i.e.*, its use is given to it by someone and not by an independent power. It is a prejudice to suppose, says Wittgenstein, that in thinking images are essential or necessary. Although sometimes imagery occurs along with understanding a sentence, yet it is not a necessary process. Other times some kind of an “amorphous” feeling may be present but that is not also an essential part. And at other times the expression of thought is itself the thought³⁶. So in thinking a separate and independent process apart from the expression of thought is not always necessary. For Wittgenstein it is a superstition to suppose that pure thought is conveyed by words and is something different from it. It is erroneous to suppose that thinking is some process in the mind accompanying the symbols. It is a fact that in two different languages the same thought may be expressed by two different sentences. But this does not imply that the thought can be found somewhere. Two sentences that express the same thought does not imply that there is a separate entity, the thought, a ‘gaseous’ entity corresponding to the sentences. During his lectures at Cambridge during 1933-34, Wittgenstein very explicitly states that thinking is not an accompaniment occurring along with talking or speaking. We are generally prone to suppose that words follow the order of thinking which should hence be a separate process. But thinking can just be the talking³⁷.

During 1934-35, he says our tendency to suppose that understanding and speaking are two different activities occurring simultaneously arises because speaking can occur without thinking and speaking can happen with understanding. According to Wittgenstein the word “understanding” is used in two different ways. One appears to refer to processes that accompany an utterance. The other use is being able to use the word.

There may be cases where some mental phenomena occur along with the hearing of a word but such a case can by no means be universal. So understanding a word cannot refer to any mental phenomena although something mental may be involved. But the problem is we cannot say what it is. And Wittgenstein’s point is that a mental experience must occur along with understanding is objectionable. It is definitely possible that we may think something and say something else as it is equally possible that we may speak what we think. Therefore, Wittgenstein is implying that speaking and thinking are not two independent and segregated processes.

May we take the liberty to infer that what the philosopher is trying to insist is that speaking is also thinking, that thought is a diverse and varied concept (‘fluid’) which cannot be tied down to the description of one phenomena? I think the answer is in the affirmative. This claim becomes all the more stronger because Wittgenstein insists that the distinction between speaking with thinking and speaking thoughtlessly lies in what happens before or after one speaks rather than what happens along with speaking.

Section 4 : Thought does not occur in a mysterious medium:

According to Wittgenstein the issue about where thought occurs is meaningless and does not constitute an essential part of the description of thought, just as a description of the visual field need not necessarily refer to an organ of sight or a toothache to a tooth. Wittgenstein points out, the expression “locality of thinking” is used in a different sense if we say thinking occurs in the head. It becomes necessary to understand the grammar of the expression “in the head” with others like “we think with our mouth”. We may say thinking takes place on paper when we write or in the mouth when we speak. We have a tendency to interpret words in ordinary language that have analogous grammars analogously. Words denoting physical activities like writing”, “speaking”, seem to suggest that words like “thinking”, “thought” also might denote an analogous but different activity. We try to look for the thought somewhere, but all that the word “thought” has or signifies is its use. And the phrase “locality of thought” has meaning or sense only if we give it one³⁸. Wittgenstein further points out, the question about what kind of an activity thinking is, is analogous to “where does thinking take place?”, the answer to which could be, on paper, in our head, in the mind. But none of these

statements gives *the* locality of thinking. The use of all these specifications is correct, but we must not be misled by the similarity of their linguistic form into a false conception of their grammar. As, e.g., when you say: "Surely, the *real* place of thought is in our head". The same applies to the idea of thinking as an activity. It is correct to say that thinking is an activity of our writing hand, of our larynx, of our head, and of our mind, so long as we understand the grammar of these statements. And it is, furthermore, extremely important to realize how, by misunderstanding the grammar of our expressions, we are led to think of one in particular of these statements as giving the *real* seat of the activity of thinking. In the *PG*, Wittgenstein says it is a dangerous idea to suppose "we think *with or in, our heads*"³⁹. And it is this association of thinking as a process in the head which gives it its occult character so he says: "It is a travesty of the truth to say 'thinking is an activity of our mind as writing is an activity of the hand'"⁴⁰.

Section 5 : Thought and Language:

Let us consider the following remarks from *BT* about thought and the expression of thought. "*The scream as an expression of pain, the proposition as an expression of thought*"; "One doesn't have a thought and *apart from it* language" and "...an articulated thought is essentially a proposition"⁴¹. The second remark implicitly points in the direction that thoughts which are unexpressed are thoughts in the language of thought. They are capable of being expressed in language, which then becomes an articulated thought called a proposition. If one is devoid of language, then one does not also have thought, *i.e.*, you cannot have thoughts apart from language. Elsewhere Wittgenstein says the expression of thought is itself the thought.⁴² These remarks reinstate Wittgenstein's belief that thinking and language are intricately interwoven. May we take the liberty to say that there is a necessary connection between them? I feel Wittgenstein's enquiry points in this direction where thinking cannot be possible without language. So thinking and using language are one and the same. At the same time Wittgenstein points out that we cannot give any reasons as to why we think at all except that we do think.

The young Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* had clearly described thought in linguistic terms devoid of any psychological element. The Tractarian picture of thought, language and reality is a picture of representation. Thought is not a mental fact and thinking and using language are

essentially the same. This view is echoed in the later transitional period also, although Wittgenstein seems to be more explicit and clear here than in the early period.

Conclusion:

Wittgenstein's quest into the concept of thought or *Gedanke* is attempted from the side of language. His inquiry reveals the extreme complexity of the grammar of the term "think". It challenges the prevalent notion of thinking as something not occurring in the observable sphere and hence which is covered in mysticism. Just as the expressions in language have innumerable uses, where the use is given by us, so is the case with thought. No one definition can be identified as the process of thinking. It is multifarious and varied. As Wittgenstein had stated in his lectures that in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates could not provide one definition of knowledge because no one definition could be given as being common to all cases of knowledge; the word "knowledge" being used in all sorts of ways⁴³.

It is seen in the post verification phase, Wittgenstein's *Notebook* entry that thinking and language are the same is made more evident and is shown more revealingly how thinking means using language and vice versa. In conclusion, it may be pointed out that Wittgenstein's analysis of the *Gedanke* establishes and reinforces the arguments against the correlation between thought and its several connotations ranging from the mystical to the occult. The meaning of words is not given to them by any independent power, independent of us. Rather the meaning of a word is something that we give it. So meaning is not something ethereal or super-human but something which is determined by human ascriptions and usage, something which lies at the heart of our way of life. The cardinal task that Wittgenstein is undertaking is that he is opening the gates to free ourselves from such unknown paths. He is urging us to look in the direction where we may not stop because of some enshrouded, unknowable, quixotic process but where we will be able to consider it as an ordinary concept in our way of life. An investigation in the unknown and hidden sphere will not reveal anything but an enquiry in its use in ordinary parlance will certainly do. So, Wittgenstein says thought does not appear to be mysterious while we are thinking about it but only when we look at it retrospectively and try to locate the mystery in the nature of the thought process.

His works embody the spirit of rationality that

emancipates thought from the servitude of inhibiting issues. Hence, thought or *Gedanke* remains and revels in its mundaneness, perhaps something not shown ever before. This phase does not vary much with the early transitional years except that Wittgenstein is more inclined towards the concept of use in language.

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4. *Ibid.* p.3.
Grammar describes the use of words in language. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell. p.60].
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.63-64.
But we cannot say that the meaning of a word is the list of rules for its use. Nor is meaning something to which one can point to. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.30].
8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.1.
In the *PG* he points out that the meaning of a name is not the bearer of the name—The expressions "the bearer of the name 'N'" is synonymous with the name "N". The expression can be used in place of the name. "The bearer of the name 'N' is sick" means "N is sick". We don't say: The meaning of "N" is sick. The name cannot lose its meaning even after the destruction of its bearer. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.64]
9. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.1.
The pointing and uttering of words work only as part of a system containing other linguistic behavior. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.71].
10. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.30;46.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.63.
11. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1966. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. Ed. C. Barrett. Oxford. Blackwell. p.2.

11. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.4.
12. *Ibid.* p.17.
13. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. *The Big Typescript TS 213*. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell.p.18e.
14. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.3.
In the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein says that meaning is not a state of mind [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.78].
15. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. *The Big Typescript TS 213*. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell.p.118e.
16. *Ibid.* pp.126e-127e.
17. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.50.
18. *Ibid.* p.77.
19. *Ibid.* p.97.
20. *Ibid.* p.113.
21. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.47.
22. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. *The Big Typescript TS 213*. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell.p.26e.
Meaning is laid down in grammar. [*Ibid.* p.51e] In attempting to find out the meaning of the word "meaning", we are enquiring about the grammar of the word "meaning": 'It really is "the meaning of meaning" we're investigating: or the grammar of the word "meaning"?' [*Ibid.* p.36e]
23. It is with the phenomenon of thinking that meaning belongs. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.144]
24. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.48-50.
25. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.143.
26. *Ibid.* p.16.
27. *Ibid.* p.4.
Elsewhere in the *BB* Wittgenstein says we are normally tempted to consider thinking as part of our 'private experience', something which is not material but an event in private consciousness. [*Ibid.* p.16]
28. *Ibid.* pp.38-39.
29. *Ibid.* p.38.
30. *Ibid*
31. *Ibid.* p.42.
32. *Ibid.* p.43.
33. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell.p.106.
34. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. pp.16-17.
35. *Ibid.* p.19-20.
36. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.52-53.
37. *Ibid.* p.52.
38. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, generally known as the Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. p.7.
39. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford. Blackwell. p.106.
The idea that thinking is a process taking place in a completely enclosed space gives it its occult character. [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. *The Big Typescript TS 213*. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell. p.173e]
40. *Ibid.*
41. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. *The Big Typescript TS 213*. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell. p.175e.
42. *Ibid.* p.176e.
43. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35*. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.96.
