

Wittgenstein in Transition 1929 - 33: The Notion of Thought (*Gedanke*)

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to analyze the concept of thought or *Gedanke* in Wittgenstein's philosophy during the early transitional period i.e. 1929 – 33. It tries to see if the early Tractarian view regarding the concept of thought or *Gedanke* persists in the transitional period. It is seen that during this period, Wittgenstein revolves around his earlier view of thought, language and reality being related to each other. Propositions represent reality by virtue of logical form, logical form being the common element between the three realms. It is also seen that Wittgenstein's non-interest in the psychological aspect of the *Gedanke* is explicit. Besides the continuity, the transition is swathed in a chain of subtle changes beginning with the adherence to verification and investigating actual phenomena. This paper shows that concerning the concept of thought, Wittgenstein in the early transitional period makes the linguistic implication more pronounced and explicit.

Key Words : Fact, *Gedanke*, Language, Pictures, proposition, Thought, Wittgenstein

INTRODUCTION

After the publication of the *Tractatus* (TLP) in 1922, Wittgenstein took a break from active philosophy and occupied himself as an elementary school teacher in Lower Austria. During these days Wittgenstein was not writing any philosophy but his association with young children had its impact. His composition of a wordbook for children shows his perpetual preoccupation with language. Wittgenstein remained in Vienna from 1926 – 1928. It was during this time that Wittgenstein met Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle had already been reading the *Tractatus* at its meetings between 1924 – 1926. Wittgenstein never took part in the Circle directly but his conversations with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann did have its impact on the Circle. The *Tractatus* was read aloud and discussed at the meetings of the Vienna Circle although it would not be correct to say that the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was the philosophy of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein attended a lecture by L.E.J. Brouwer in Vienna in 1929

and from then on, he returned to active philosophy. He returned to Cambridge and received the doctorate degree in June 1929 and was appointed Fellow of Trinity College from 1930. He began lecturing at Cambridge till 1947.

The early transitional phase covers the years 1929 – 1932. The *Philosophical Remarks* may be considered the first work in this period. It was also the work which helped Wittgenstein renew the grant for his research. Just after returning to Cambridge, Wittgenstein wrote an essay *Some Remarks on Logical Form* in 1929. It was the only other work other than the *Tractatus* to be published during Wittgenstein's lifetime. Waismann's record of conversations with Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's lectures from 1930 – 1932, recorded by his students, Moore's Lecture notes from 1930 – 1933, and the above-mentioned works belong to the early transitional period in Wittgenstein's philosophy. This period records some chief and novel ideas the chief one being verification. Nevertheless, a Tractarian ring is present but his discussion is more candid and forthright.

Section 1 : Thought, Language and Ontology:

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein states that there is a distinction between the thought that x is the case, the proposition that x is the case and the fact that x is the case; the thought and proposition indicating the method of finding out whether x is the case.¹ This is a restatement of the Tractarian position that thought, language and reality are related to each other.² Here Wittgenstein is not resorting to any kind of picturing but rather says that proposition/thought indicates the method of finding out the fact. Or in other words it is the fact which verifies the other two. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein says two things are involved in the fact that a thought is true *i.e.*, the fact and the thought.³ This may be taken to imply that it is the fact which verifies a true thought. In the Lent Term of 1930, Wittgenstein is close to his Tractarian opinion. He says representation in language is done in two ways. Firstly, propositions represent a state of affairs and are either true or false. The only difference with his Tractarian viewpoint is that he is now using the word ‘represent’ instead of ‘picture.’ In the *TLP* the picturing was done by a one-to-one correspondence but now propositions represent facts (in the sense of being literal pictures) and no one-to-one correspondence is alluded to. Wittgenstein secondly, points out for propositions to represent there must be some common element between both language and reality. Wittgenstein also points out that for thought to be thought, thought must have the logical form of reality. These remarks reverberate the early view point. Elsewhere in the *Lectures* Wittgenstein says that what is common between thought and reality must already be expressed in the expression of the thought.⁴ It is abundantly clear that Wittgenstein is still revolving around his older doctrine of propositions representing reality by virtue of logical form and that between thought, language and reality there must be logical form in common.

Wittgenstein reverts to the pictorial nature of propositions often but it needs to be seen whether he was using the expression ‘propositions are pictures’ in the same way as he had used it in the Tractarian days. In the *Philosophical Remarks* he says that the pictorial nature of propositions become evident if propositions are considered as instructions for making models.⁵ In the *Lectures*, Wittgenstein at the very beginning says that language consists of proposition and a proposition is a picture of reality and we compare propositions with reality; that there must be a picture – pictured relation

between propositions and reality because propositions prescribe actions.⁶ Regarding pictures, Wittgenstein says that a picture is a picture in the sense of a portrait, where one resembles the other and a picture can also be a picture not in the sense of resembling but in intention.⁷ In the conversations with Waismann, Wittgenstein remarks that in the early period when he was considering a proposition to be a logical picture of facts (*TLP* 3, 4.01, 4.03) or was comparing propositions to a model (*TLP* 4.01, 4.04), he was primarily concerned with the common element of propositions and pictures. Wittgenstein goes on to say that in the early days he was using a picture in the same way as a proposition because both agree in a certain respect.⁸ Now this particular remark is very important in the sense that it testifies the fact that in the *Tractatus* he was considering *Gedanke* and proposition to be the same in structure. Now he interprets *TLP* 3 which says that a thought is a logical picture of facts as a proposition being a logical picture of facts. This shows that thought and proposition were on the same level in the early period and he attempted to show their relation with facts or ontology. And picturing came up because of the common element between a picture and a proposition and one could be used in the same manner as the other. This is the transitional Wittgenstein interpreting his ‘pictures’ from a neo point. Consider Moore’s *Lecture* notes:

In connection with the *Tractatus* statement that propositions, in the ‘narrower’ sense with which we are now concerned, are ‘pictures’, he said he had not at that time noticed that the word ‘picture’ was vague; but he still, even towards the end of (III), said that he thought it ‘useful to say “A proposition is a picture *or something like one*”’ although in (II) he had said he was willing to admit that to call a proposition a ‘picture’ was misleading; that propositions are not pictures ‘in any ordinary sense’; and that to say that they are, ‘merely stresses a certain aspect of the grammar of the word “propositions” – merely stresses that our uses of the words “proposition” and “picture” follow similar rules’.⁹

[III consists of lectures given in the May Term of 1932; II consists of lectures in the academic year 1930-31].

Moore also points out that Wittgenstein often used the words ‘project’ and ‘projection’ in regard to the question of similarity between experiential ‘propositions’ and ‘pictures’. This testifies that Wittgenstein is now

relating experiential propositions with pictures. All these remarks afford, beyond reasonable doubt that Wittgenstein is still endorsing a kind of representational theory. He still insists on the comparison of propositions with pictures, but with literal pictures. He no longer alludes to the isomorphic theory by means of which the proposition was a picture of reality but now propositions are pictures in the literal sense. In the conversations, Wittgenstein categorically says that during the Tractarian days the concept of logical analysis and ostensive definition were unclear to him. At that time, he thought a connexion existed between language and reality (*TLP* 3.263). This neocomparison of propositions with pictures retains none of the famous older view of logical atomism and Wittgenstein now prefers to say that the words 'proposition' and 'picture' can be used similarly. This shows a beginning of his later thinking about the correlation of meaning with the use of expressions in majority of cases.¹⁰ It appears that Wittgenstein is in an oscillating mood; he still proclaims the representationalism of language. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein points out that when a child thinks, it must think in terms of pictures but these pictures are arbitrary in the sense that other pictures could perform the same function also.¹¹ Therefore it is clear that the theory of the constituents of thought, language and reality corresponding to each other is no longer the cardinal point. In its place is introduced a comparison, although representationalism still persists.

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein states that there are no true apriori propositions because language can never show the truth or falsehood of any particular proposition but only the possibility of constructing them.¹² In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein asserts that the truth value of a thought or proposition cannot be determined by an inspection of it.¹³ If there are no true apriori propositions, we may infer that there are no true apriori thoughts as well (based on the premise that thought and language have the same structure). The *Tractatus* of course does not categorically state anything like this although there are some statements in this direction. Consider *TLP* 3.04: If a thought were correct apriori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth and *TLP* 3.05: Apriori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with). The *Tractatus* says that a thought is a propositional sign projected onto reality so obviously the question of its truth value will depend on whether it agrees or disagrees with

reality. Therefore, the possibility of a thought being true apriori is ruled out in the *TLP*. This possibility is stated more explicitly in this period and one cannot fail to notice the continuity in the concept of the *Gedanke* in this respect from the early days.

Both in the *Lectures* and the *Philosophical Remarks* we find Wittgenstein asserting the point that propositions are expressions of thought and so also are plans, which may not always be in words. He also says that a thought may be a wish or an order and that the terms expectation, thought, wish etc. that *p* will be the case is the process having the multiplicity that finds expression in *p*. Wittgenstein calls an articulated process a thought because the expressions (of thought) are articulated, the processes being the interpretation of signs. From these remarks it is clear that thought has varied expressions, *i.e.*, wishes, plans, orders, propositions etc. Wittgenstein had not spoken of such expressions of thought in the early period although he had equated thought and proposition. The concept of wishes, plans, orders as being expressions of thought is an additive. Wittgenstein is now saying that a thought is an articulated process. In the *Tractatus* he had said that a proposition is articulate and is not a mere blend of words (*TLP* 3.141).¹⁴ On the basis that thought and language/proposition are the same (in structure) we may say that the concept of thought being an articulated process was already hinted covertly in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein now states it explicitly. Definitely the continuity in conceptualizing the *Gedanke* cannot be overlooked.

In Waismann's *Theses*, a work elucidating the Tractarian statements, some important entries on the *Gedanke* may be noted. Waismann writes, in picturing facts to ourselves we produce thoughts and in grasping a thought we grasp its sense which is the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. Waismann, goes on to write that the object of a thought is a fact and by means of thoughts we reach beyond reality. He further writes, a proposition is the perceptible expression of a thought and language must extend as far as thoughts.¹⁵ These entries by Waismann elucidate the Tractarian view that thought and language correspond with each other and are related to reality. Other obvious indications can be cited which proclaim that language and thought are convoluted. In the *Philosophical Remarks*, for example, Wittgenstein writes that probably the first use of language can be traced to the occasion when a definite thought was translated into spoken words and that learning a language can be

done by a child only by thinking in that language and it is hopeless that a child can use a language but cannot think in it:

The arbitrariness of linguistic expressions: might we say : A child must of course learn to speak a particular language, but doesn't have to learn to think; *i.e.*, it would think spontaneously, even without learning any language?

But in my view, if it thinks, then it forms for itself pictures and in a certain sense these are arbitrary, that is to say, in so far as other pictures could have played the same role. On the other hand, language has certainly also come about naturally, *i.e.*, there must presumably have been a first man who for the first time expressed a definite thought in spoken words. And besides, the whole question is a matter of indifference because a child learning a language only learns it by beginning to think in it. Suddenly beginning; I mean: there is no preliminary stage in which a child already uses a language, so to speak uses it for communication, but does not yet think in it.¹⁶

The-point that thought and language are the same is restated.—Therefore, we cannot fail to notice the continuation of the Tractarian view that thought and proposition, *i.e.*, thinking and using language are not two separate processes.

Section 2 : Propositions

If thought and proposition are the same in their form, then it becomes essential to see what Wittgenstein is saying in connection with propositions in the transitional period. Firstly, language consists of propositions and a proposition is a picture of reality and we compare propositions with reality.¹⁷ Secondly, propositions are the basic elements of our description of the world and can be significantly negated.¹⁸ Thirdly, they are the smallest units of language having sense.¹⁹ Fourthly, propositions describe facts, *i.e.*, what is the case and are either true or false.²⁰ Fifthly, to understand the sense of a proposition is to know how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided.²¹ Sixthly, the constituents of propositions are words which function only in propositions and have no meaning or function outside propositions.²² The last feature enumerated registers a clear deviation from the *Tractatus*. In the *TLP* simple signs in propositions were called names (*TLP* 3.202) and a name in a proposition

was the representative of an object (*TLP* 3.22). Wittgenstein had not spoken of words at all in the early period but had said that a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition. Now it is noted that he considers words instead of names to be the constituents of propositions. Moreover, names were used in the technical sense of directly signifying objects as their meanings. It remains to be seen whether words are also used in a technical sense. Regarding the relation of proposition and reality, Wittgenstein says it is like the relation of a measuring rod to an object; just like a measuring rod can measure an object from different sides so also a proposition can be held against reality from different aspects.²³

Moore recalls Wittgenstein saying, that the question 'What is a proposition' is one that is not clearly understood; yet later on he considered it more or less arbitrary as to what we call a proposition and still later Wittgenstein said that he could not give a general definition of 'proposition' any more than he could give of 'game' and that he could only give examples and any standard would be 'arbitrary' because nobody would have decided whether to call so-and-so a 'proposition' or not.²⁴ Moore writes :

In (II), however, he had said that the word 'proposition', 'as generally understood', includes both 'what I call propositions', also 'hypotheses', and also mathematical propositions; that the distinction between these three 'kinds' is a 'logical distinction', and that therefore there must be some grammatical rules, in the case of each kind, which apply to that kind and not to the other two; but that the 'truth-function' rules apply to all three, and that is why they are all called 'propositions'.²⁵

As is well known and also certified by Moore's Lecture notes, Wittgenstein distinguished between three different kinds of propositions in this period. 'Genuine' propositions are the first kind. They are those that can be conclusively verified or falsified by comparison with reality. Such propositions describe immediate experience and hence may be called sense-datum statements. The second class of propositions are called 'Hypotheses'. Such propositions cannot be verified conclusively by being referred to experience. Hypotheses include propositions about objective particulars, about the past or future, about other people's mental states, universal generalizations, laws of nature etc. They are different from the propositions of immediate experience and cannot be

classified as true or false in the same sense. They have a different formal relation to reality from those statements which can be conclusively verified. 'Mathematical propositions' constitute the third class. Such propositions cannot be compared with reality and therefore neither agree nor disagree with reality. The sense of a mathematical proposition is given by its proof. The genuine propositions are referred by Moore as 'experiential propositions. Based on this the following deductions can be made about the *Gedanke* (considering that thought and proposition are similar in form):

- 1) Language may also be said to consist of thoughts (or as expressions/or identical) and a thought is a picture of reality and thoughts can be compared with reality. [From - language consists of propositions, and proposition and thought are the same in form and thoughts find expressions in propositions]
- 2) Thoughts may be considered to be one of the basic elements in the description of the world and can be significantly negated.
- 3) Thoughts have sense.
- 4) Thoughts describe facts and are either true or false.
- 5) The sense of a thought can be understood by knowing how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided. The nameless constituents of thought function only in the process of thought and may be said to correspond to the words of propositions.²⁶ But these constituents cannot be said to have objects as their meanings.
- 5) A thought can be held up against reality from different aspects.
- 6) It is a system of thoughts that are compared with reality.

Therefore, we notice some significant shifts in the Wittgensteinian concept of the proposition during this stage and so also the same should apply in the case of thought.

Section 3 The Non-Psychological *Gedanke*:

Wittgenstein's non-interest in the psychological aspect of the *Gedanke* displays an incessant persistence from the Tractarian days. In the *Lectures*, Wittgenstein in no uncertain terms says it is injurious to consider the physiological process of thought like where it occurs, whether it involves images etc.; this should not be the concern of a philosopher but rather his subject of query

is the symbolic aspect of thought process. Wittgenstein points out that quite contrary to common belief, thought is not a hidden process but an open process to be seen.²⁷ Elsewhere he says that a philosophical analysis of thought can give no new information about it and even if it did, it would not be of substantial interest. Thought as a scientific analysis is a psychological event, capable of explanation by means of other thoughts. The new data that may be provided by this kind of scientific analysis is of no concern to the philosopher.²⁸ Therefore, a similar line of speculation is noticeable as in the early days. Wittgenstein now appears to be more vociferous in his stress that philosophy and the psychological *Gedanke* are distinct arenas and the latter cannot be the subject matter of the former. This case is again echoed in the Lent Term of 1931 where in answer to the question what a proposition is, and whether it is an expression of a thought, Wittgenstein points out that thought as a psychological process serves no utility to the philosopher. The causes, conditions and effects of thought should not be our concern but rather we should be interested in thought as a symbolic process, whose duration is as long as its expression.²⁹ Elsewhere in the *Lectures* Wittgenstein also emphasizes the correctness of the study of the non-psychological aspect of thought: He says that it is a mistake to suppose that in thought some kind of a representation occurs in the mind and emphasizes that there are no mental processes that cannot be symbolized.

...But, it may be asked, even if words do not stand for or represent things, cannot thought do so? Is not this the peculiar property of mental phenomena? Is there not representation "in the mind"? This suggestion is a pernicious mistake. It separates thought into two parts, organic (essential) and inorganic (non-essential). But no part of thought is more organic than another. There is no mental process which cannot be symbolized, and if there were such a process which could not take place on the blackboard, it would not help. For I could still ask for a description of this process, and the description would be in symbols which would have a relation to reality. We are only interested in what can be symbolised.³⁰

Therefore, the *Lectures* testify that Wittgenstein is keen to avoid the psychological study of the *Gedanke* in so far as the study of the philosophy of language is concerned and thought is not some hidden mysterious

process having an enigmatic character. At least not from the view point of philosophical study and if it did that should not be the concern of philosophy.

In the conversations with Waismann, a footnote mentions that thinking does not imply the generation of experiences; for example, for understanding words like 'blue', 'red', etc. it is not necessary to hallucinate colours but rather it would suffice to understand the sense of the proposition where the words occur.³¹ In the conversations Wittgenstein also argues against the prevalent view that understanding is a psychological process accompanying a spoken or a written proposition. He admits that it is true that we cannot deny that a number of processes occur within us when we hear or read a proposition like conjuring an image, various kinds of associations, etc., yet understanding cannot be said to be a particular psychological process at all. Understanding, says Wittgenstein, is operating with a proposition and cannot be an internal state like a toothache.³² Therefore the general notion of understanding as an internal mental process is under the axe. This is in conformity with the early view that the psychological consideration of thought is extraneous to philosophy. All these references show beyond any reasonable doubt that the concept of something going on in the mind, a hidden mental process is irrelevant to philosophy and emphasize the persistence with the early period.

Section 4 : Thinking and Speaking:

Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Remarks* states that thought is an articulated process.³³ This remark can be taken to imply that thoughts in order to be thoughts have to be expressed. Or may we infer that there can be thoughts which cannot be expressed in sensible language? If this is the case then obviously we see the continuity from the Tractarian period that there is a part which cannot be put into words (*TLP* 6.522) *i.e.*, the unsaid (the nonsense) part of the *TLP*. According to the *Tractatus* in the domain of the sensible, language and thought are the same, *i.e.*, co-extensive while in the expanse of the non-sensible, which constitutes a large portion, lies the unsaid part, which can only be shown but cannot be spoken of. In this segment language and thought do not integrate and agree to each other, *i.e.*, they are not co-extensive. So, the possibility remains that thinking is possible without speaking (in the early period).

In the conversations Wittgenstein says that man has a tendency to run up against the limits of language.³⁴

The limits of language were already mentioned in the *TLP* (*TLP* 6.522) and he now says that it is ethics.³⁵ It is in ethics that we attempt to say something that cannot be said. So what lies on the other side of language, what cannot be said is now explicitly mentioned by the author of the *Tractatus* as being ethics; it is the unsaid part. Wittgenstein also points out that all description is within the world and in a complete description of the world an ethical proposition does not occur; he also says what is ethical is not a state of affairs.³⁶ So the previously established distinction between sense and nonsense, in terms of what can be said and what cannot be has endured the first phase of the transitional years.

In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein says that if it is the case that a sentence makes sense to one and not to another person then in that case it implies that the two persons are not using the words with the same meaning, *i.e.*, one is giving a different meaning to the words or is speaking without thinking.³⁷ From this it is evident that speaking without thinking is a possible case and that depends on the way one is using words. In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein says:

You can describe the experience of learning a particular language, but you cannot describe the experience of learning to use language because you would then have to be able to think what it was like to have no language at all—*i.e.*, to think what it would be like not to think.³⁸

This remark may be interpreted to imply that learning to use language begins by thinking in that language. This has been endorsed in the *Philosophical Remarks* where he says that we think in a language and it is impossible for a child to use a language but not think in it. It may be inferred that it is in this sense that language and thought are considered to be the same, accorded the same status. In the Preface to the *TLP*, Wittgenstein says that to draw a limit to thought we have to be able to think what cannot be thought. We can collate this remark with the previous cited remark from the *Lectures* that we cannot think what it is like not to think at all.³⁹ Such remarks tend to imply the perpetuity of the opinion that language and thought are co-extensive (atleast in the field of the sensible) and one cannot happen without the other. Therefore, thinking without speaking is ruled out in the sphere of the sensible

Conclusion:

In conclusion it may be pointed out that the early transitional years treats the concept of the *Gedanke* from

linguistic considerations and any reference to its psychological aspect is exclusively avoided. Apart from a re-affirmation of the Tractarian viewpoint that thought and language are the same in structure, certain modifications are also noted. The ontological reference of the *Gedanke* is not alluded to in this period. This is perhaps primarily due to the abandonment of the atomic theory which is replaced by the verifiability criterion of meaning. To understand a proposition, according to Wittgenstein, now, is to know how it is verified or falsified, *i.e.*, which phenomena would verify or falsify it. So we may choose to infer that thought is also verifiable through phenomena. It is here that the ontological reference of thought comes in albeit in a new garb. There is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of language, thought and reality but rather thought/language verify or falsify phenomena. Analysis is no longer necessary but experience of sense-data is the paradigm in the determination about the world. Wittgenstein is very clear in his thesis that thinking is not a mental process (*i.e.*, as a mental phenomenon it is not the subject matter of philosophy). Thought is nothing but the words themselves, *i.e.*, language, and any other process is extraneous and redundant. So, there are not two processes, one the mental process, thought and the other the expression of thought in words. It may be noted that Wittgenstein is bringing in his new ideas but also confirming to his older views.

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4. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. p.37
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12. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. pp 23-24
13. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Philosophical Remarks*. Ed. R. Rhees. Translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford. Blackwell. p.78
14. There are other statements in the *Tractatus* asserting that a proposition is articulate. *TLP* 4.032 states that only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated is it a picture of a situation. *TLP* 3.251 states that a proposition is articulate. Now from the Tractarian point of view since thought is a proposition with a sense (*TLP* 4) we may deduce that thought being a logical picture of facts (*TLP* 3) is so only by virtue of being logically articulated.
15. Waismann, Friedrich. 1979. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Translated by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.235
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17. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures,*

- Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. p.1 This has already been stated in the *Tractatus* at TLP 4.01 and 4.05
18. *Ibid* p.22
 19. *Ibid* p.57
 20. *Ibid* p.45
 21. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Philosophical Remarks*. Ed. R. Rhees. Translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford. Blackwell. p.77
 22. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. p.2
 23. *Ibid*, p.6.
The *Tractatus* states that a picture is laid against reality like a measure (TLP 2.1512). In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein says a proposition fits onto reality in case we compare it with reality [PR p.77]. In the conversations, Wittgenstein points out that his previous conception of laying a proposition against reality like a ruler (TLP 2.1512-2.15121) needs to be amended. Instead he now recommends speaking of a system of propositions rather than a proposition being laid against reality like a measure. An entire system of propositions is compared with reality. For example, when we say that a particular point is blue, we also mean that it is not red, green or orange. And in that case the entire colour scale has been laid against reality at once. And Wittgenstein states that his previous conception was erroneous and it led him to believe that it was not possible to infer the non-existence of one state of affairs from the existence of another (TLP 2.062, 4.211, 5.1314-5.135). But on his new conception of a system of propositions being compared to reality, it is possible to infer from the existence of one state of affairs, the non-existence of all the other states of affairs described by this system of propositions [WVC pp. 63-64].
 24. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. p.261
 25. *Ibid*
 26. In reply the Russell's query regarding the constituents of thought, Wittgenstein had written "I don't know *what* the constituents of a thought are, but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language ..." [letter to Russell, 1919]. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1961. *Notebooks 1914-16*. Ed. G.H.von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. Includes *Notes on Logic*(Sep. 1913); *Notes dictated to Moore in Norway* (April, 1914); and some extracts from *Letters to Russell* (1912-21)p.130.
 27. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.24-26
 28. *Ibid*. p.34.
This remark is reminiscent of the early opinion in 1919 that thought as a psychological process should not be of interest to the philosopher.
Also consider TLP 4.1121 which states that psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science. The opposition to a psychological approach and analysis is very apparent.
 29. *Ibid* p.37
 30. *Ibid* p.45
 31. Waismann, Freidrich. 1979. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Translated by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.86
 32. *Ibid* p.167
 33. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Philosophical Remarks*. Ed. R. Rhees. Translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.69-70
 34. Waismann, Freidrich. 1979. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Translated by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.68
 35. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had said that it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental and that ethics and aesthetics are one and the same (TLP 6.421).
 36. Waismann, Freidrich. 1979. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Translated by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.92
 37. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Philosophical Remarks*. Ed. R. Rhees. Translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.54-55.
 38. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930 – 32*. From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Ed. Desmond Lee. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.85-86
 39. Also consider TLP 5.61 and *Notebooks*p84e which state that what cannot be imagined cannot even be talked of. These remarks imply that learning to use language originates in thinking and so both are co-extensive.
