

Changing Development Discourse : A Subaltern Prospective

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ABSTRACT

A development discourse has taken various modes of stream time to time, but the question is that for what and for whom? Is it for the elite, capitalist and well developed or for the seekers and needy of it? Development for academic discourse or for industrialist? Development is merely limited with construction and production of something? These questions are to be addressed in order to put some checks on destruction of the subaltern by the name of development. Through this paper I'm going to address all the questions have been raised above. This paper is divided into various sections and subsections whereas each section would be autonomous and explanatory in nature. All sections would be coherent and interlinked with their central theme of this paper. I will begin with defining subaltern and its location in development discourse in India. Then various development discourses and models would be discussed, also I will try to locate the development with destruction by providing some case studies of Indian context. Lastly my main argument of subalternity with changing development discourse would be discussed. Alongwith these sections I will in corporate lucid Introduction and brief conclusion.

Key Words : Development discourse, Subaltern, Destruction, Models of development discourse, Changing discourse

INTRODUCTION

Although the term is ubiquitous, there are continuing debates about exactly what is meant by 'development'. We might easily agree with Bruce Currie-Alder et al.'s basic definition that development is 'how societies change over time', but this still leaves open important questions of how and why they change. Heinz Arndt helpfully distinguished between two main meanings: development as something that is done (and therefore involves intention and choice) and development as something that happens (occurring according to some kind of largely predetermined ex ante logic). Confusion arises because the word 'development' is sometimes used to refer to change and its consequences, while other times it refers to the intentions of institutional actors to bring change about. For example, the term may be variously used to refer to broad processes of economic and social transformation, particularly under capitalism; to describe conditions in particular areas or countries and the levels of 'progress'

that they contain; or simply to refer to the international activities of aid agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Two related conceptualizations have been used to try to address this problem. First was Michael Cowen and Robert W. Shenton's historical enquiry into 'the invention of development' as both an idea and as practice, and the ambiguities around its different meanings. They proposed a clearer distinction between development as 'immanent process' and 'intentional practice', having identified the source of the problem as confusion between development as unfolding societal change and development 'as a goal faction'. They argued that the concept of intentional development had originally emerged from the recognition during the nineteenth century of 'the essential unity of creation and destruction contained with in the process of development', and that it had primarily been conceived as a tool for managing the disorder produced by capitalist transformation, underpinned by a concept of 'trusteeship' that assumed the government's

role and good judgment in protecting the welfare of its citizens.

The second conceptualisation was human geographer Gillian Hart's well-known distinction between 'Development', which she characterized as the conscious efforts of development agencies to intervene and promote positive change, and 'development', the wider patterns of societal change that produces both winners and losers from struggles around power and resources. For Hart this distinction was productive because it enabled a more fully historicized analysis of contemporary neoliberal capitalism and global power, and potentially offered in sight into how dominant discourses could be challenged and alternative development paths constructed. Hart's 'D/d' distinction was taken up in various ways within development studies. It helped provide a simple framing device for introductory teaching in development, informed debates about theory and practice in development, and it has been used to challenge managerial and technical approaches to development that pay insufficient attention to politics, context and history. For example, Sharad Chari and Stuart Corbridge describe the post-1945 era as one in which 'Development was capitalized' and turned into 'something that governments and private companies direct, perhaps in combination with leading global agencies like the World Bank.

Different Phases of Development:

After the industrialization, we can see broadly three main phases of the development which emerged in 20th century in the world are Little Development (LD), Big Development (BD) and HD (Human Development). In the little development, the state was in the main center for the development. Only state was the responsible for the development. During the First World War, it was the great challenge for the state to develop the nation, therefore welfare was stretched. In the Big development phase, instead of state the role of market came to existence. Various trade unions were made in order to promote the world trade. After the Second World War, the role of financial institutions like World Bank and IMF was increased. In the third phase, human development feature was signified, this phase was propagated by the great economist Amartya Sen, gave more emphasis on human development rather than any of institution because the only human is the center of anything and all the development process is ultimately meant for the human itself.

Development from the Subaltern Prospective:

Who is 'subaltern', I will explain it later, first we will try to understand how we should locate the discourse of development into the subaltern prospective. After the brief explanation of different phases of development, we must have understood that later on human got recognition for the center element of development. Now we should try to know that subaltern as a human being is being recognized in the process of development or not? But here the answer is very simple, that is 'no', how? That I will let you know by presenting some case studies of Orissa state in India, here I will put some arguments in order to proof my simple answer to tough question one. Why these tribal people have been displaced? Why these people have done various moments in order to protect their mother earth? My answer is lies

with the answers of these questions. Economic disparity is everywhere, the welfare state is spending thousands of crores for the poor's and for the other subaltern groups of the society. But the condition of subaltern groups remained same as they were. Developmental policies have been implemented for the ground but mediators and contractors use to digest all the benefit. The agents of the government are also responsible for this (Nanda, 2013). They know the ground reality but are not able to report anything in the political pressure from the above strata of the administration. For the sake of their own profit government and political leaders give permission for the various projects, even knowing about ground reality, and its impacts. We can see some of the example from the case study section of this paper. For the capitalist, human is just a commodity who purchase their products, lead a new capital for them for the further profit making process. Different kinds of complexes, multi-plexus, advanced technology, advanced industries and other molls and markets for whom? These are really meant for that human who seeks and needs for it indeed? I will come to this point again in other sections of this paper.

Who is Subaltern? A Conceptual Analysis:

In the last two decades of the 20th century, Subaltern Studies, post colonial theory and criticism gained momentum, especially, as a corollary to globalization in the Third World countries. If post colonial criticism is taken as an offshoot of post modernism, subaltern studies derives its force from Marxism, post structuralism and becomes a part of the post colonial criticism. "Subaltern",

meaning “of inferior rank”, is a term adopted by Antonio Gramsci to refer to those working class people in Soviet Union who are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes. Subaltern classes may include peasants, workers and other groups denied access to hegemonic power (Prakash, 1994). Gramsci was interested in the historiography of the subaltern ‘classes’. In Notes on Italian History, he outlined a six-point plan for studying the history of the subaltern classes which include: 1) their objective formation; 2) their active and passive affiliation to the dominant political formations; 3) the birth of new parties and dominant groups; 4) the formations that the subaltern groups produce to press their claims; and 5) new formations within the old framework that assert the autonomy of the subaltern classes; and other points referring to trade unions and political parties. Gramsci claimed that the history of the subaltern classes was just as complex as the history of the dominant classes, although the history of the latter is that which is accepted as the “official” history. For him, the history of the subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic, since they are always subject to the activity of the ruling groups, even when they rebel (Hardiman, 1986).

The term has been adopted to post colonial studies from the work of the Subaltern Studies Group, a team of historians, who aimed to promote systematic discussion of subaltern themes in South Asian studies. It is used in Subaltern Studies as a name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society, whether this is expressed in terms of class, gender race etc. The group was formed by Ranajit Guha and included Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Partha Chatterjee, David Hardiman, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Gyanendra Pandey. The group has produced 5 volumes of Subaltern Studies – essays relating to the history, politics, economics and sociology of subalternity as well as the attitudes, ideologies and belief systems. In other words, Subaltern Studies defined itself as an attempt to allow the people to speak within the pages of elitist historiography, and in so doing, to speak for, or to sound the muted voices of the truly oppressed (Chakrabarty, 2013).

The concept of the “subaltern” gained increased prominence and currency with Gayatri Spivak’s *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (1985) which was a commentary on the work of the Subaltern Studies Group, questioning and exposing their patronizing attitude. Contradictory to the stereotyping tendencies found in Said’s *Orientalism* and other similar texts, which presume the colonial oppression

as monolithic, Spivak adapts Derridean deconstructive techniques to point out the different forms of subject formations and “othering” (Perusek, 1993). Much of Spivak’s ideas are informed by her interactions with ‘the Subaltern Studies Group, including Ranajit Guha and Dipesh Chakrabarty. Spivak suggests that it is impossible to recover the voice of the subaltern, hinting at the unimaginable extent of colonial repression and its historical intersection with patriarchy — which she illustrates with particular reference to colonial debates on widow immolation in India. As observed by scholars like Lata Mani, in the colonial discussions on the practice of Sati, the Indian widow is absent as a subject and that the subject is denied as space to speak from. She suggests that elite men have found away to “speak”, but for those, further down the hierarchy, self-representation is almost impossible. Spivak challenges the intellectuals’ and the post colonial historians’ assumption that the voices and perspectives of the oppressed can be recovered. She effectively warns the post colonial critics against homogenizing and romanticizing the subaltern subject (Studdert-Kennedy, 1996). However, Spivak’s insistence on subaltern “silence” has been attacked by Benita Parry, in her critique of Spivak’s reading of Jean Rhys’ *Wide Sargasso Sea* as ‘deliberate deafness to the native voice, where it can be heard.’ Parry suggests that such deafness arises out of Spivak’s theory of subaltern silence which attributes “absolute power to the hegemonic discourse. Parry goes along with Homi Bhabha in asserting that the colonists’ text contains a native voice, though an ambivalent one. The colonial text’s hybridity in the words of Bhabha means that the Subaltern has spoken. The historian of modern India, Gyan Prakash, points out that the Subaltern studies project derives its force as post colonial criticism from a combination of Marxism, post-structuralism, post modernism, Gramsci and Foucault, the modern West and India, archival research and textual criticism. Subaltern Studies borrows post modernist ideas and methods for textual analysis. Post modernism cannot be understood without a reference to capitalism. Therefore, post colonial criticism must also be explained in terms of capitalism and neo-colonialism. Members of the Subaltern Studies group felt that although Marxist historians produced impressive and pioneering studies, their claim to represent the history of the masses remained debatable. Their main thesis is that colonialist, nationalist and Marxist interpretations of Indian history had robbed the common people of their agency. The subaltern studies

collective thus announced a new approach to restore agency to the subordinated, in order to rectify the elitist bias as characteristic of much academic work in South Asian studies. The subaltern's agency was restored by theorizing that the elite in India played a dominant role and not simply a hegemonic one. Thus, with the logic of this theory, the Subaltern were made into autonomous historical actors, who then seemingly acted on their own, since, they were not seen to be led by the elite. At the same time, Subaltern Studies differed from Western historian's attempts to write "history from below." British workers left their diaries behind for British historians to find their voice in, but Indian workers and peasants did not leave behind any "original, authentic" voices. Therefore, to find Indian subaltern voices, subaltern studies had to use different methods, of reading the available documents, i.e., read them "against their grain." In the process of pursuing this goal, subaltern studies concentrated more and more on how subalternity was constituted rather than finding their voices. Other subalternist writings on elite/colonial discourse includes David Arnold's work on the Indian body, disease and medicine; Gyanendra Pandey's critique of the "construction of communalism in colonial North India" and Bernard Cohn's essay on language and colonial command. Subaltern theorists of the nation and modernity such as Partha Chatterjee, Sudipta Kaviraj and Dipesh Chakrabarty maintain that "the Indian nation is not an object of discovery but an invention." Narratives of the nation conceal inconsistencies, ideological contradictions, fissures and ruptures in the national fabric, and present the picture of a unified nation (Lal, 2001). This homogenizing of the narratives of the nation coincide with the grand narratives of the triumph of modernity. Spivak points out that, by such a practice, the oppressed are being more silenced, in that, s/he cannot/does not speak, but is spoken for. The subaltern consciousness is a construction of the elite discourse and it is due to this discourse that their marginality is sustained (Roy, 2002). Robert J.C. Young, in his commentary on Spivak, observes that subaltern woman has her identity only within the patriarchal and imperialist discourse. Spivak, in a later work, *French Feminism in an International Frame* (1987) discusses the irony of the French Feminists, in their investigation of issues faced by the Third World women.

Is this Development or Destruction? A Critical Analysis of Case Study of Orissa State in India:

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Peasant movements like Chipko (northern India) and peasant protests reveal how policies of economic 'development' or 'modernization' formulated at the top levels of states, corporations and international financial institutions are often experienced by peasants, rural women, and laborers- as exploitation. In the strategies of economic development, indigenous people, landless peasants, and women are expected to bear the brunt of industrialization, disease, food scarcity and land hunger testify to the impact of this process (Ramchandra Guha, *The Unquiet Woods*, pp. 195-196, 1990).

Addressing a huge tribal rally on 30 Jan, 2008 at Kashipur, Orissa, Mukta Jhodia, an adivasi woman activist, exhorted: "You Collector, you Government, you Tehsildar, have you given us this land, this forest and the treasure under the earth? We have got this gift of the nature and have been enjoying for thousands of years since our fore fathers. Who are you and who gave you the right to snatch away these from us? We will continue to fight till death to save our mother earth than allow you to destroy these nature given river, land and jungle."

The three major movements namely, Baliapaal movement in Balasore district against the missile range, the Gandhamardhan movement against the Bharat Aluminum Company (Balco) project and the Chilika movement against the Tata and government of Orissa combine shrimp project which many ways mark the genesis of 'people's movement' in post-colonial Orissa can be traced back to mid-80s and early-90s. All the three projects were either public sector projects or a public-private project like Chilika (Singh, 2011). The movement against the proposed aluminum project by an MNC called Utkal Alumina which surfaced in Kashipur was the lone movement against a private sector enterprise during the said period. On the basis of critical observations made by the leaders of these movements of the period, it has been rather aptly reasoned out that local people in Baliapaal and Chilika had got organized spontaneously into a movement due to a perceived threat to livelihood and environment, given the traditions of movements in these localities. 2 People from outside however later joined to bolster the movement. But in the absence of a tradition of such movement in Gandhamardan, local people started the movement only after youth from outside made them aware of the dangers of the upcoming project and they (the locals) became victims of the project. Second, wherever local people have voluntarily organized themselves and started a movement, the leaders have

been upset at attempts by outside people to join the movement and be little the local leadership. The resultant conflict between the local leaders and outsiders has often adversely impacted upon the people's movement, as it weakened the movement in Chilika. Third, despite differing political loyalties among people, people have not shied away from getting united and involved in the movement even though the role of the political leaders has been vacillating, controversial and suspect. The same party that opposed the project while in opposition thrusts it upon the people after coming to power; similarly, the same party that has tried to impose the project on people while in power opposes it when it becomes the opposition. Fourth, the role of local/regional media has not been very encouraging for the movements; it is rather the national newspapers that have brought the movements to public gaze. Similarly, with a few exception (support of academics, students and staff of Jabalpur University for Gandhamardan movement) intellectuals at the regional plane have largely remained quite a pathetic to these movements, while support of intellectuals from outside the region particularly from Delhi have been rather encouraging. Fifth, there has been an attempt by the local leadership to keep the movements confined to the local area out of fear of losing their grip if they spread outside. But, interestingly, the state and local leaders who provoked the local people against the projects they were opposing, also did not want the movement to break the local barriers, though for entirely different reasons (Sinha, 2016 and Singh, 2016).

They were afraid that if people's movements in general became widespread, they would pose some fundamental questions that would threaten the foundations of the establishment, to which actually both the ruling parties and opposition belong. With the advent of the New Economic Policy since early 1990s, the Indian state has declared its high-voltage war against poverty through its strategy of rapid 'industrialization'. Based on this logic, the panacea for alleviating poverty of Orissa, one of the underdeveloped states of Indian republic, has been attributed to the establishment of mining based industries, given the huge mineral resources that the state possess (90% India's chrome ore and nickel reserves; 70% of bauxite; and 24% of coal reserves).⁴ The understanding has led to the process of leasing out mines to private investment, and to put on offer land with adequate infrastructure for industrial houses, so as to usher in prosperity replacing poverty in no time

(Chandhoke, 2005). This has led to the opening up mineral resources to private capital, both national and foreign; moreover the campaign for development of the state has been so intense that in no time it has caught the imagination of the global companies. The mantra that 'industrialization' would herald immense employment opportunities for the educated unemployed as well as the unskilled poor, while helping the cash-strapped state to tide over its perpetual revenue deficit through taxes, royalties, land sales etc. have been vociferously voiced by the government, the corporate media, the international aid agencies, and the World-bank etc. in no uncertain terms. The new buzzwords like 'foreign investments', 'export promotion' and 'privatization', and '4SEZ' remain central to the course of development (Ebrahim, 2001).

Given the rich mineral resources of the state, the road-map to this neo-liberal industrialization is principally geared towards 'harnessing Orissa's vast natural resources'. No doubt, the unique potential of the state in terms of endowment of minerals have made the profiteering multinational companies look at Orissa as their hot destination. This has further boosted the image of Orissa as the mineral hotspot of the Indian subcontinent with foreign investors queuing up for investment in the state. The state has appeared on the investment map of India with a long list of investment proposals, largely backed by foreign investors. Majority of the new projects are solely attracted by the mineral resources of the state and therefore, are located in only mineral-rich regions which are also inhabited by the tribes. The state government has offered exceptionally huge subsidies to investors, in the form of guarantees, tax concessions and investment subsidy. The abundance of cheap labor has further made it an investor-friendly state (Sarkar, 2008). Orissa has so far attracted private investments of over Rs. 4,00,000 crore for setting up mineral-based industries such as steel mills, power plants, and alumina refineries. In the steel sector, 43 MoUs have been signed for the production of 58 million tonnes of steel annually at a total investment of around Rs. 1,40,000 crore. The rush to make steel gained momentum towards the last quarter of 2004 after officials of the Korean steel major. Poseo, announced plans to set up a 12-million-tonne steel plant at an investment of Rs. 51,000 crore, the highest ever FDI in the country. In the energy sector, apart from Reliance Energy, major companies that have come forward to set up power plants include NLC, Tata Power Company, Sterlite Energy, KBK Nilachal, and Monnet

Ispat. With regard to aluminium, Vedanta Alumina is tied up with a one million-tonne refinery in Kalahandi at an investment of Rs. 4,500 crore. So also, Utkal Alumina is with a one-million tonne refinery in Rayagada district at an investment of Rs 4,000 crore. The Aditya Birla Group has signed MoU to set up a three million-tonne alumina complex with an investment of Rs 12,000 crore. Development of ports has also been taken up by private parties. In the IT sector, Infosys and Satyam are already operating in the State. Wipro, TCS, Hexaware, and Mind Tree have inked MoUs to setup facilities. Education and tourism have also been seen as other potential sectors attracting investments (Menon, 2011). The Anil Agarwal Foundation (a part of the Vedanta group) has also announced the setting up of an ambitious multi-disciplinary University at an investment of Rs 15,000 crore with a projected student strength of 100,000. However, against the background of the brutal killing of 14 tribal people in Kalinga Nagar in 2 Jan 2006, the need to locate the broad features of Orissan economy in relation to agriculture and industry has assumed critical importance. It is important to remember that the congregation of tribal people leading to the tragic murder through perpetration of state violence was simply not a protest over the attempt by Tata Company to build boundary wall for its proposed steel plant project but rather alarmingly, a massive resistance against a kind of development associated with industrialization and displacement. Often cited as a region for starvation death, Orissa houses 3.58% of the country's population spread over 30 Districts and 57,000 villages (Oommen, 2006). Orissa is the poorest amongst the states with 47.15% people Below Poverty Line as per the 1999-2000 estimates of the Planning Commission. The rural poverty is 48.01 % while that in the urban it is 42.83%. The overall poverty ratio has remained stagnant since 1993-94 preceded by its steady decline during the phase of 1978-94. Moreover, the incidence of poverty has increased both in south and northern regions whereas a perceptible decline has been experienced in coastal Orissa (Ziai, 2013).

The occupational classification reveals that total workers in the State constitute 38.7% of the total population and out of which cultivators account for 35.8% of the main workers with 21.9% being agriculture laborers. Agriculture continues to be the main stay of the State economy with the contribution of 25.78% to NSDP (2004-05). In the state, 37.3% of the land is designated forest area and 37.2% of the land is the net area sown

(5796 thousand hectares). Under the category of 'Mand put to non-agricultural use' there has been an increase from 746 thousand hectares in 1990 to 999 thousand hectares in 2004. Similarly "barren and unculturable land" has also increased from 499 to 843 thousand hectares during the same period. The increase in the above two categories of land use has resulted in the decline in the 'net area sown' and 'permanent pastures' (Rohatynskyj, 2011). Since 2000, a total of 94 projects have been allotted forest area of 6207.08 hectares which brings out the increasing pattern of diversion of forest area for non-forest use. Orissa's Dalit and Adivasi population constitute 45% of the state's population who live mostly in the rural region. Being home to 62 groups, India supports one of the largest Adivasi populations (12%) of India. With a significant constituent of the Dalit and Adivasi population who remain at the lower rung of the society in contrast to a tiny elite class at the top and fragmented caste population in the middle, the disparity in the social structure of Orissa is strikingly evident. One of the eminent paradoxes of Orissa is that the tribal population is a defining feature of the state but the political and economic relations are not defined by them. It is equally important here to take into account the statistical history of displacement and rehabilitation in Orissa since independence till about the end of 20th century. With the introduction of planned development, Orissa saw the launching of notable projects like Rourkela Steel Plant and Hirakud Multipurpose Dam in the 1950s; Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Talcher Thermal Power Station (TTPS), and Balimela Hydroelectric Project in the 1960s; Rengali, Upper Kolab, Upper Indravati Multipurpose Dam and Subarnarekha Major Irrigation Dam in the 1970s; IB Thermal Power Project, Talcher Super Thermal Power Station and National Aluminium Company (Nalco) at two locations in the 1980s. Besides these mega projects, open cast coal mining also started in the state in the 1960s resulting in large land acquisition -mainly agricultural lands for mining operations. These projects were executed in resource-rich regions, traditionally inhabited by tribal people (Kumar, 2000). Along with their benefits to the state, the development projects have resulted in large-scale deforestation not only for raw material exploitation, but also for acquisition of vast areas of land under cultivation for the establishment of factories, reservoirs and required residential complexes. The unintended consequence of such projects has not only meant loss of habitat for the

rural tribal poor, but also of their means of livelihood, which had been mainly agriculture, and utilization and sale of forest produce. The groups displaced have been invariably the weaker sections of the society mostly belonging to the tribal people and lower castes. The rehabilitation and resettlement scenario of the project oustees indicate high backlog even in the official estimates. Of the total oustees of Hirakud Dam numbering 22,144 families, only 4,744 families have been rehabilitated; of which 3,098 families are yet to receive full compensation. Out of 10,897 families displaced in Rengali project, only 2,986 have been either resettled in colonies or allotted land, and cash grant was given to 7,901 families. Similarly, with 2,364 families getting displaced by Rourkela Steel Plant, only 1,721 families were allotted house plots. Likewise, Nalco Damanjodi which displaced 610 families for mining and alumina plants could only resettle 462 families in colonies (R. Menon 2011). More unfortunate is the fate of the thousands of Adivasi families displaced from HAL, Naval Armament Depot, central cattle breeding farms at Sunabeda in Koraput district; and the Adivasi oustees of Macchkund Kolaband Indravati dams. The tragedy of displacement has been intensely traumatic for certain groups of people who have undergone multiple displacements. The case of the oustees of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Hirakud Dam project in Orissa is illustrative of this human tragedy. Most of the oustees of HAL in Koraput district, who were displaced in the 1960s for the first time, faced the trauma of a second displacement in the 1980s due to the construction of the Upper Kolab Multipurpose Dam Project, and were again displaced for the third time because of the establishment of the Naval Armament Depot and agricultural farms. Similarly, the oustees of Hirakud Multipurpose Dam project, who were displaced in the mid-1950s and resettled in Brajaraj nagar area of Jharsuguda district, faced displacement for the second time due to the construction of the IB Thermal Power Station in the late 1980s and some others because of the IB valley coal mining project in the 1980-90 project.

The above account of rehabilitation and resettlement in official estimates suggests a large-scale backlog going back to the period as early as 1950s and it is extremely difficult to even trace out these families. The burden of displacement and the trauma associated with it is borne mainly by the under privileged, such as tribal people and other vulnerable sections of the population, who have to make a highly disproportionate sacrifice for being the

voluntary victims of displacement from their habitat, society and culture. Almost all 'development' projects have been initiated mostly on the tribal hinterlands of Orissa. It is worth noting that the resettlement policies mostly have failed to take into account the aspects of environment and common property resources in the pre-displacement economy; and the qualities of life that are threatened by resettlement process, such as family ties and community participation which perhaps provide the context for stimulating vibrancy to resistance process by the displaced people. Further, it has also been argued that people tend to organize themselves by actively affirming local identity, culture and systems of knowledge as integral parts of their resistance.

Conclusion:

There is very less literature is available for the development discourse changing from subaltern prospective, we should think in that way as well. Development should be sub altern oriented now. Otherwise economic disparities will keep on increasing. For the sake of development, we should not do anything without knowing further consequences.

Development should be holistic in nature rather than one sided or limited. This is our duty and obligation that we must protect every living being of the world without harming in any moment of life.

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