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Tension Unveiled: Exploring the India-Pakistan Rivalry's Impact on South Asia

RESEARCH ARTICLE

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DR. SUBHASH KUMAR BAITHA

Assistant Professor Department of International Relations, Central University of Jharkhand Ranchi (Jharkhand) India

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict gave rise to India and Pakistan, who have been embroiled in it from the beginning. Many theories have been put out to explain the events and reasons behind the subcontinent's split into India and Pakistan, the two different nations that emerged from British administration. Conflict gave rise to India and Pakistan, who have been embroiled in it from the beginning. Many theories have been put out to explain the events and reasons behind the subcontinent's split into India and Pakistan, the two different nations that emerged from British administration (Misra, 2007). Terrorism and the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan have been the main sources of hostility between India and Pakistan during the past 20 years. The South Asian Region was also affected by the global upheavals brought about by the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. These have a specific influence on the character of South Asia's strategic change. It demanded that international ties be reoriented. Within ten years of the end of the Cold War, the conversation around global security shifted to one of terrorism. The 1996 book Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington helped to describe the type of war that is likely to occur in the future (Banerjee, 2014). The nature of British disengagement from colonial India and its effects on Indo-Pakistani relations, the opposing ideologies of India and Pakistan-one secular, the other based on religion-as well as the strength of Pakistan's and India's anti-irredentist stances on Kashmir are the three structural factors at the core of the wars between India and Pakistan that began in 1947 (Saeed, 1989).

The most significant barrier to regional cooperation in South Asia is the tense relationship that has existed between India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947. The bilateral relations between them were hampered by a range of political, economic, and security issues as well as mutual mistrust. India and Pakistan are the two largest nations in South Asia. The South Asian Region was greatly affected by their tense relationship. The conflicts and issues between India and Pakistan have made this area almost a captive. Despite passing many resolutions, the Association of South Asia or SAARC, was unable to establish meaningful commercial or economic ties. The region is still split, and there is little to no communication among the participants (Majid, 2017).

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Recent events in the South Asian subcontinent's vicinity and the growing direct participation of superpowers in the issues facing Afghanistan and the Gulf have made relations between India and Pakistan significant to the outside world once more. Following almost ten years of comparatively benign indifference, Washington and Moscow policymakers are now again taking a serious interest in the Indo-Pakistani issue. More complicating matters, a new Cold War between the superpowers began at the same time as the subcontinent's dramatic decline in its immediate surroundings. The war's central theatre was firmly established in the region that is increasingly being recognised as South-West Asia, which stretches from the subcontinent's western borders to the Red Sea and includes the oil-rich Gulf (Ayoob, 1982).

India-Pakistan Origin

Nearly from the moment of their founding and independence, the independent republics of Pakistan and India were at odds with one another. Three elements have dominated the conventional explanation of this actual civil war: nationalism, colonialism, and communalism. Before 1947, the residents of these two neighbouring republics formed a single political country as subjects of the British Empire (Gilman, 1998). There are several theories explaining why the subcontinent was divided along religious lines. While the official historiography of Pakistan emphasises the so-called 'two nations' theory-that is, that Muslims and Hindus are two separate populations or nations, each in need of its own polity-nationalist historians in India attribute the partition to colonial politics (Sil, 2009). Nonetheless, the concept of Muslim nationhood was significantly influenced by communalism, an imprecise and confusing term that in South Asia may refer to both sectarian and cultural disputes between Hindus and Muslims. Even the Sunni Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence in the Uttar Pradesh, which produced anti-colonial, seminary-educated priests, saw themselves as Indian patriots rather than defenders of an Islamic or Muslim state. The Great Mutiny of 1857, in which Muslim and Hindu sepoys rose against their shared adversary, the British East India Company, was spurred by this feeling. Some Hindus in late colonial India seemed to subscribe to the two-nation thesis or even to a communal conscience. The renowned author and scholar Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay connected nation-building and Hindu consciousness (Ray, 2003).

Jinnah's fundamentalist communal policy, British rule, the Muslim League, and the Indian National Congress were among the factors that led to the partition of India and Pakistan. By the 19th century, riots and imperialism had created a situation in which Indians began to demand their rights from British rule. The partition was caused by the demand of British rule and the Muslim League, but historical records and historians demonstrate that the Congress Party had failed to bring all segments of Indian society together for the nation's independence (Martin, 2000). The Congress Party was going through internal strife at the time, and Hindus and nationalists were also beginning to engage in an internal power struggle. Because of this, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League established the framework for an independent Islamic country. The British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in Delhi in March 1947 to complete the partition of India and put an end to British control in the country (Ansari, 2017). By which the August partition of India was proclaimed. Then, under the direction of British barrister Cyril Radcliffe, a Border Commission was established, and on August 14, 1947 and August 15, 1947, at midnight, Pakistan and India became.

India-Pakistan Rivalry

 First Indo-Pak War: The Indian Independence Act of 1947 outlined a partition plan that gave Kashmir, which was controlled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh and was politically and physically sandwiched between India and Pakistan, the choice to join either nation. In October 1947, the Muslim residents of northern Kashmir began to protest India's potential accession. They were joined in their demands for Azad Kashmir by tribal people who had been transported by Pakistan from the North-West Frontier. The Maharaja allegedly signed the Instrument of Accession on October 27 after requesting sanctuary in India. Following this, Pakistani and Indian military units were stationed on opposite sides of the international border in anticipation of a showdown, even though neither country officially declared war (Sil, 2009). The First Kashmir War, which broke out in the autumn and early winter of 1947, took place amid this backdrop. In order to mediate the conflict, the UN Security Council formed the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in January 1948. In January 1949, it suggested a referendum, demilitarisation, and ceasefire. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan will oversee the ceasefire line (CFL) along the international boundary between India and Pakistan. The UN Security Council expanded UNCIP's membership in April and in July, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement (Sil, 2008).

- Second Indo-Pak War: Pakistan saw an opportunity to achieve their goal of regaining territory by force at the time when India had become demoralized-the Chinese defeat of the Indian army during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. In the 10,000 square mile salt marsh known as the Rann of Kutch, which lies between the Gulf of Kutch and the Indus River basin, Pakistan's military started an investigation into a disputed border zone with India. The Battle of Rann of Kutch saw a comparatively feeble response and performance from India, which incentivized the Pakistani military to resolve the Kashmir dispute by military means (Ganguly, 1990). The Indian force was counterattacked by the Pakistani army later in the month around Tithwal, Uri, Bedore and Poonch. This was followed by an Indian incursion into Azad Kashmir and the seizure of many Pakistani mountain outposts close to the Kargil region. The UN issued a ceasefire appeal in September 1965 and requested assistance from the governments of India and Pakistan in overseeing the truce's adherence. Both sides persisted in breaking the cease-fire agreements, and the Security Council convened many times between late September and early November 1965. Following a meeting between the special UN envoy and the officials of India and Pakistan, a ceasefire was reached in December 1965. After meeting in the Soviet Union's Tashkent in January 1966, India and Pakistan decided to remove all armed forces by February 1966 and return to their pre-war locations (Igbal and Hussain, 2018).
- Third Indo-Pak War: The civil unrest against the tyrannical leadership of West Pakistan that broke out in East Pakistan in March 1971 marked the beginning of this conflict. General Yahya Khan, the head of Pakistan's armed forces, issued an order to take action against the alleged 'Bengali separatist'. India actively backed the separatists in Bengal who sought to secede from West Pakistan and interfered in the civil war. India attacked East Pakistan by land, air and water at their request. In just 13 days, they were able to compel the Pakistani army to surrender in Dhaka and capture 90,000 men as prisoners of war. In December 1971, East Pakistan gained independence and joined Bangladesh. In July 1972, hostilities between India and Pakistan came to an end when both nations signed the Shimla Agreement, promising to resolve their issues via peace means (ibid).
- Fourth Indo-Pak War: An Indian counteroffensive resulted from Pakistani soldiers and rebels from Kashmir seizing key locations on the Indian side of the Line of Control in May

1999. The goal of the Pakistani military's occupation of the Dras-Kargil area was to give the Kashmiri independence struggle a boost. This led to a short and small-scale conflict between the two recently equipped powers with nuclear weapons. This time, the international community-especially the US-was alarmed and took decisive action to put an end to hostilities between the two nations in July 1999 (Qadir, 2002).

India-Pakistan and South Asian Region

Nuclear war in South Asia

The deep-seated animosity and enmity between India and Pakistan are the root cause of the nuclearization of South Asia. India conducted its own nuclear test in May 1974 at Pokhran, near the Pakistani border in the Rajasthan desert. Ten years later, Pakistan created its own project and made it public in March 1987 in retaliation for India's nuclear test. Although both countries wished to maintain nuclear ambiguity, it was thought in the 1980s and 1990s that both India and Pakistan had achieved nuclear capability. But both India and Pakistan detonated their nuclear weapons in May 1998, eliminating all room for doubt. This incident significantly altered the security landscape in the whole South Asian area. India and Pakistan, who have serious border problems, are about to become nuclear weapons states. The region's armament has caused serious issues for SAARC's policy planning and development (Majid, 2017).

The disparity between India and Pakistan will eventually show out in nuclear affairs, just as it does in other domains. In response to a nuclear assault by Pakistan, India would be able to produce a great deal more weaponry than Pakistan, distribute and position them over a broader area of land for retaliation strikes and maintain a threat of even greater devastation. The real post-nuclear environment in South Asia may develop halfway between two extremes: a world powers-imposed complete quarantine and a benign sanitization achieved through systemic constraints (Marwah, 1981).

Terrorism

The rise of Jamaat-e-Muhammad, the addition of the already active extremist organisation Lashkar-e-Toiba, and particularly when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan fell in 2001, Pakistan, Azad Kashmir, and the United Front of Afghanistan have all come to be known as the centre for terrorism (Sil, 2009). The leaders of Pakistan seem to be fully aware that following 9/11, their long-standing practise of designating rebels in Kashmir as 'freedom fighters' has lost almost all of its credibility. Nevertheless, as long as Pakistan's armed forces are still fighting politically delicate combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda relics along Afghanistan's border, they have been hesitant to completely crack down on the terrorist organisations that threaten India. Furthermore, it is more possible that Pakistan will obtain similarly significant concessions from India after, not before, a total shutdown of the terrorist organisations based in Pakistan that are hostile to India. India and Pakistan signed the 1987 SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism's Additional Protocol, which appeared to be more restrictive, together during the SAARC summit in January 2004. However, the majority of the groups that India has banned in recent years under the Public Order and Terrorism Act (POTA) have their headquarters in Pakistan. The Indian government officially states that more than 75% of the 'foreign terrorists' that have been killed or apprehended since the insurgency in Kashmir began in the early 1990s are from Pakistan (Wirsing, 2004).

India-Pakistan and Super powers

India's obsession with strength and manoeuvrability, especially when dealing with a declared ally such as the Soviet Union, is a reflection of New Delhi's long-standing foreign policy concerns that set Indian political reflexes apart from Pakistan's. In actuality, the starkly different-in many respects, antithetical-reactions of Pakistan and India to recent occurrences in the subcontinent's environs. India's attempt to implement the principle of autonomy has logically resulted in the exclusion of superpowers from participating in subcontinental affairs. Despite ups and downs, the cooperative Indo-Soviet partnership has endured for over 30 years, largely due to this confluence of interests. Regarding India, the foundation of this relationship has been the country's autonomy of action globally as well as its priority over Soviet interests in the South Asian region. 'Borrowing power' from outside sources is the primary idea around which much of Pakistan's foreign policy has been constructed. In large part, this strategy is the product of the Pakistani leadership's effort to counterbalance India's dominance in power on the subcontinent (Ayoob, 1982).

India's growth has an impact on US foreign policy. India, according to some, is a possible China opponent and may be included in a balance of power plan that the US wants to implement against Beijing (Cohen, 2016). Even as India is forging friendships with the US, Pakistan is uniting with China in an attempt to overcome India. The major bilateral project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor aims to further integrate South Asian nations and enhance commerce with China by enhancing infrastructure within Pakistan.

Conclusion:

As the two largest nations in South Asia, India and Pakistan must take the lead in fostering cooperation in the region and grow to be its main backers, otherwise, the initiative would fail. If India wants to be more accommodating to its smaller allies, Pakistan must follow the SAARC model without interfering with its bilateral issues with India. To address its conflicts and issues with its neighbours, Pakistan benefits from broadening its areas of cooperation with India. A nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict was avoided in South Asia during the first ten years following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. But this does not imply that the region has become more stable as a result of nuclear proliferation. Indeed, a major contributing factor to the subcontinent's instability has been the use of nuclear weapons. In the past, when the globe was bipolar, Pakistan and India had tight ties with Washington and Moscow, respectively. The growth of Tibet, the Himalayan frontier, and China. India is a growing power today that has the potential to become a global force due to its tremendous economic expansion. Development is hampered by the rise of ethnic sectarianism and religious fanaticism across the subcontinent. Peace and stability are vitally required since India and Pakistan will greatly benefit the area.

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